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ABSTRACT 
Are Independent Directors Effective in Lowering Earnings Management in China? 
(August 2005) 
Liona Hoi Yan Lai, B.A., University of Waterloo 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Lynn Rees 
 
 
 
This study examines whether board independence is an effective corporate 
governance mechanism in reducing earnings management in China, a country with 
significantly different institutional and legal characteristics from the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. I investigate: (i) whether voluntary adoption of board independence prior to 
the China Regulatory Securities Commission (CSRC) regulation on board independence 
is associated with lower earnings management; and (ii) the extent to which the CSRC 
regulation is effective in achieving the aim of inhibiting earnings management. I employ 
two stage least squares techniques to control for potential simultaneity problems between 
earnings management and board independence and documents that failing to control for 
such problems will lead to biased and inco sistent estimates. Using three different 
measures of earnings management, I show that firms that voluntarily move towards 
board independence (i) have lower levels of discretionary accruals; (ii) employ less 
severe income smoothing strategies; and (iii) are less likely to manage return on equity 
to meet regulatory thresholds. In contrast, firms adopting board independence following 
the CSRC regulation in 2002 do not experience any changes in the levels of earnings 
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management before and after the regulation. These results suggest that regulation alone 
is not a sufficient solution to motivate effective independent boards.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A board of directors is one of several monitoring mechanisms that has been 
developed in modern corporations to resolve agency problems between top management 
and shareholders. In the U.S. and the U.K, academics and regulators have emphasized 
the important monitoring role of independent directors within a firm’s corporate 
governance structure (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983; SEC 1980; American Law 
Institute 1982).  Whereas the concept of independent directors is largely Anglo-Saxon, 
the trend of setting up boards with stronger independence has spread to other countries. 
In 2001, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued guidelines that 
required all listed firms to have at least two independent directors by June 2002 and one-
third of the board must be independent of management by June 2003. The apparent 
premise underlying such a movement is that independent directors have, in fact, 
effectively served their monitoring role in the U.S. and the U.K. and that this concept is 
applicable to other parts of the world.1 Given the myriad of institutional and legal 
arrangements that cracterize different countries, it is reasonable to examine whether 
independent directors are effective in countries that differ significantly from the U.S. and 
the U.K.  To shed light on such a question, this paper investigates the effectiveness of 
                                                   
This dissertation follows the style of Th Accounting Review. 
 
1 Evidence on the effectiveness of independent directors, however, is mixed even in the U.S. Researchers 
have been unable to document any evidence showing a positive relation between the degree of board 
independence and long-term firm performance in the U.S. (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Agrawal and 
Knoeber 1996; Klein 1998; Bhagat and Black 2002). On the other hand, other studies reveal that 
independent directors are effective in protecting shareholders’ interests in acute situations and in 
performing specific tasks. For instance, firms with a higher outsider/insider ratio have a stronger 
propensity to replace a CEO following poor performance (Weisbach 1988).  Also, firms with m re 
independent directors experience higher abnormal returns upon announcing management buyouts (Lee et 
al. 1992), tender offers (Byrd and Hickman 1992), and the adoption of poison pills (Brickley et al. 1994). 
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independent directors in China. Specifically, this paper studies whether independent 
directors effectively reduce earnings management in Chinese publicly listed firms.  
China provides a particularly intriguing study for the monitoring role of 
independent directors in curtailing earnings management. First, the p actice of earnings 
management is both extensive and extreme in China. In 2001, the auditor-general of the 
State Auditing Bureau reported that “more than two-thirds of 1,290 largest state 
companies covered in an official audit [in 2000] falsified their accounts, with the illegal 
money exceeding 100,000,000,000 Yuan.” (O’Neill 2001) Academic studies also 
confirm the prevalence and severity of earnings management in China (e.g., Aharony et 
al. 2000; Chen and Yuan 2004). 
Second, in the U.S. and the U.K., the inclusion of independent directors is likely 
a market solution to some agency problems. In China, on the other hand, the inclusion of 
independent directors was made mandatory since 2002. China therefore provides a 
particularly interesting laboratory to shed light on whether independent board of 
directors is effective when it is a pure product of regulation. 
Third, the institutional and legal environment in China is substantively different 
from that of the U.S. and the U.K. While the lack of alternative monitoring mechanisms 
in Chinese firms highlights the importance of independent directors to serve a 
monitoring role, other factors such as the concentration of ownership by the state, a 
weak investor protection environment and an excessive demand over supply of 
independent directors likely undermine the effectiveness of independent directors in 
China. Therefore, although several empirical studies find that firms with stronger board 
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independence are related to lower earnings management in the U.S. and the U.K.,2 
whether independent directors are effective at reducing earnings management in a 
country such as China remains an empirical question.  
Moreover, China is still in its infancy in terms of employing independent 
directors as monitors. Even with the regulation, many firms still have a board with a 
minority of independence directors. It could be argued that independent directors serve 
as effective monitors only when they represent a majority in the board. Alternatively, it 
could also be argued that the marginal effect of an additional director is stronger when 
the proportion of independent directors is small. Evidence on this issue is mixed in the 
U.S. and the U.K. (see, e.g., Peasnell et al. 1998; Klein 2002b). The present study on 
China therefore helps shed light on whether independent directors are effective in 
reducing earnings management when they represent only a minority of the board. 
The present empirical analysis is conducted using data on board of directors from 
2000 to 2003 for firms listed on the Shanghai stock exchange and Shenzhen stock 
exchange. Since both pre-managed earnings and earnings manipulation techniques are 
unobservable, I utilize three proxies to better capture the underlying construct of 
earnings management (EM). The first two measures of earnings management capture 
manager’s discretion in influencing report outcomes through the use of accruals. The 
first accrual measure is based on the Modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995; Bartov 
                                                   
2 Beasley (1996) and Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms with stronger board independence are less likely 
to be subject to SEC enforcement actions for accounting violations and frauds. In the earnings 
management literature, Klein (2002b) demonstrates that boards are effective in lowering earnings 
management when more than 50% of the board is comprised of independent directors in the U.S. Peasnell 
et al. (1998) also support that higher fraction of independent directors is associated with lower levels of 
earnings management in the U.K. 
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et al. 2000) and the second accrual measure is based on the relation between accruals 
change and cash flows change (Dechow 1994; Skinner and Myers 1999; Leuz et al. 
2003). The last earnings management measure is developed based on the distinctive 
incentive in China to manage earnings and captures the likelihood of firms managing 
return on equity (ROE) to meet regulatory thresholds of rights issuance and listing 
requirements. 
To examine the effectiveness of independent directors in China, I conduct two 
main test . First, I conduct a cross-sectional analysis on whether firms with board of 
directors exceeding the regulatory requirement experience lower level of earnings 
management. I also examine whether firms with a higher fraction of independent 
directors experience lower earnings management. Due to changes in the regulatory 
requirement of board structure from 2001 to 2003, the cross-sec ional te ts are carried 
out year-by-year. My second test is a direct test of the CSRC regulation on board 
structure and whether  law is effective in reducing earnings management in Chinese 
firms. Specifically, I examine the change in earnings management before and after the 
regulation is in place in the overall sample, as well as in the sample of firms that begin to 
adopt indepndent directors post regulation. 
The empirical results from the cross-sectional analysis confirm an inverse 
relation between board independence and earnings management in the pr -regulation 
period. In 2001, firms with at least one independent director experi nce lower levels of 
earnings management than firms without independent directors, after controlling for the 
simultaneity problem between board independence and earnings management. Similar 
  
5
 
results are also found using the fraction of independent directors as a measure for board 
independence. These results are consistent in all three EM measures. Results from the 
post-regulation period under the three EM measures show that firms with board of 
directors exceeding the regulatory requirement or with a higher fraction of independent 
directors are not associated with lower levels of earnings management.  
These results suggest either that having a minimum number of independent board 
members is important but adding additional members beyond the minimum has no 
incremental benefit, or that firms that acquire independent directors voluntarily without 
the law have the incentives to ensure the independent directors perform their duties but 
firms that adopt independent directors by law lack the incentives to maintain a well-
functioned independent board. The results of the test on the change in levels of 
discretionary accruals from 2001 to 2002, however, point to the latter interpretation. For 
the overall sample, as well as for the sample of firms that began to adopt independent 
directors after the law, it is found that there is no change in the average practice of 
earnings management before and after the regulation. Therefore, having a minimum 
number of independent directors is not sufficient. A firm’s incentives to ensure the 
proper functioning of its independent directors are imperative for independent directors 
to serve as effective monitors on earnings management. 
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. It contributes to the 
corporate governance literature by assessing the effectiveness of independent directors in 
a country with institutional features significantly different from the U.S. and the U.K. 
The research is timely as more than 18 countries have recently established rules to 
  
6
 
mandate the inclusion of independent directors on company boards (Dahya and 
McConnell 2002). This paper also addresses the questions of whether independent board 
of directors functions properly when it is a pure product of regulation and whether 
independent directors are effective when they form only a minority of the board. In 
addition, even though simultaneity problem is often addressed in the literature on the 
relationship between independent board of directors and firm performance (Hermalin 
and Weisbach 1991; Bhagat nd Black 2002), addressing simultaneity problem in the 
relationship between board independence and earnings management is original. The 
present finding that the degree of earnings management in a firm potentially affects its 
choice of board structure implies that researchers should be careful of any simultaneity 
problem inherent between corporate governance mechanisms and the outcome variable 
of interest when evaluating the effectiveness of such mechanisms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I discuss the background of 
the adoption of independent directors in China in Section II and develop the hypotheses. 
Section III discusses the earnings management measures. Section IV discusses the 
variables to be used in the study and Section V describes th  methodology, the data and 
provides descriptive statistics.  In Section VI, I present the results. Section VII concludes 
the paper. 
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II. HYPOTHESES  
The Road Map to Board Independence in China 
The last thirty years have witnessed a trend toward stronger board i dependence 
among U.S. firms. While in the sixties, most boards in U.S. corporations had a majority 
of inside directors, today, most have a majority of independent directors.3 More recently, 
this trend toward a more prominent role for independent irectors has become global. 
Starting with the Cadbury Committee report issued in 1992 in the U.K., a number of 
countries have since followed suit to issue mandates or guidelines for board composition 
(Dahya and McConnell 2002). These include not only Australia, France, and Sweden, 
but also countries with substantially different economic, institutional, and legal 
environments such as Brazil, Korea, Malaysia, and Mexico. 
In China, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) has been trying 
to advance the concept of independent directors since 1997. The first guideline on 
corporate governance for listed companies in China was introduced in 1997 and the 
adoption was voluntary.  Since then, there have been a number of opinions and 
guidelines issued by the two stock exchanges (the Shanghai stock exchange and the 
Shenzhen stock exchange). However, none of these guidelines were intended to be 
mandatory and not many firms followed the guidelines in the implementation of 
independent directors. In 2001, the CSRC reported that there were only 314 independent 
directors out of the 1100 listed firms on both exchanges (Clarke 2001).
                                                   
3 For example, Klein (2002b) reports, on average, approximately 60% of board members are outsiders in 
her sample of S&P 500 firms in 1992-19 3 and about 74% of these firms have boards with a majority of 
independent directors. Similarly, Dahya et al (2002) find that the mean proportion of outside directors on 
the U.K. boards has risen from 35% in 1989-1992 to 46% in 1993-1 96. 
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In view of the small number of firms following the voluntary guidelines for good 
corporate governance practices, the CSRC issued a more comprehensive guidance on 
independent directors in August 2001; and more importantly, this guidance was made 
mandatory. Under the mandate, all listed firms are required to have at least two 
independent directors by June 2002 and one-third of the board must be independent of 
management by June 2003. Another aim of the regulation was to clearly define the 
qualification for independence, to layout the nomination procedures, and to outline the 
responsibilities of independent directors. In the final version of this “Guidance Opinion 
on the establishment of an independent director system in listed companies”, measures 
have been taken to ensure that independent directors will represent minority 
shareholders. For example, there are specific rules that exclude persons hol ing more 
than 1% of shares of the firm, or persons employed by the unit that hold more than 5% 
of the shares of the firm to become independent directors. In the nomination process, any 
shareholders holding more than 1% of the shares independently or jointly can nominate 
independent directors. Furthermore, all related party transactions exceeding 5% of the 
firms’ net assets must be reviewed and approved by the independent directors. This last 
provision is designed to curb the severe problem of insider deal gs among Chinese 
firms. This guideline is a big leap from the prior endeavors to regulate board structure 
among listed firms in China. 
Behind the development in China and the global movement toward stronger 
board independence is the implicit belief that independent directors are effective 
monitors. In China, for example, the CRSC’s effort can be seen as a response to curtail 
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the prevalence and severity of fraudulent accounting and stock price manipulation. But, 
another possible reason for the action taken by the CSRC is that as the global economy 
becomes more integrated, regulators simply respond to pressure from foreign 
institutional investors whobelieve in the effectiveness of their cultural institutions. 
China, for example, first started to open its securities market to foreign investors in 
1992, when the B share market was launched. More recently, China decided to open its 
much larger A share market to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors (QFII), which 
was initiated in 1998 and finally launched i  2002. The CRSC’s mandate in 2001 
concerning board composition can therefore be seen as part of the concerted effort to 
attract foreign investment. 
Hypotheses Development 
Despite the effort of the CSRC to encourage board independence, there are a 
number of institutional features of China that might either enhance or hamper the 
monitoring role of independent directors. In the next sub-section, I discuss the factors 
that may affect the effectiveness of independent directors in China. 
Factors that might affect the effectiveness of independent directors in China 
Lack of alternative corporate governance mechanisms. In China, the lack of 
alternative corporate governance mechanisms highlights the importance of independent 
directors as monitors. Many governance mechanisms that U.S. firms utilize, such as 
monitoring from blockholders, takeovers, and management stock ownership, are 
uncommon among Chinese firms (Tam 2002). While institutional owners and creditors 
are effective monitors in the U.S., there are a very sm ll number of institutional owners 
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in China. Furthermore, banks in China are also government owned and must issue loans 
to firms based on national policies and preset interest rates. Thus there is virtually no 
monitoring from creditors in China either. In addition, since the State controls more than 
50% of the shares in 85% of the firms in China, and their shares are not publicly traded, 
hostile takeovers are rare. Internal governance mechanisms are insufficient because 
stock based incentive compensation schemes are uncommon in China. In a sample of 
788 Chinese firm-year observations used in a study of corporate governance conducted 
by the Center for China Financial Research, the mean stock ownership by the top 5 
executives is only 0.0187% of total outstanding shares. In contrast, in a study by Denis 
and Sarin (1999) on executive stock ownership in the U.S., they find that the average 
CEO in their sample holds more than 7% of the firm’s shares. 
Similarly, since the Chinese auditing profession is still in its infancy, the reliance 
on independent directors to protect minority shareholders’ interests is considerable, as 
external auditors likely fail to act as monitors of the financial reporting process. 
Although China recently adopted a set of new auditing standards in 1995, which were 
patterned after the International Standards of Auditing, auditors’ expertise and 
independence still cause concerns among the investor community. At the end of 1997, 
there were only 1,000 CPAs licensed to audit listed companies and the selection process 
is in part political (DeFond et al. 1999). Furthermore, government affiliated audit firms 
control 75% of the market share in China. This causes concerns about auditors’ 
independence because government- elat d entities are also controlling shareholders of 
more than half of the listed companies. 
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Because alternative governance mechanisms are lacking, an increase in 
representation by independent directors in the board is more likely to contribute to 
effective overall monitoring in China. In the U.S., where alternative governance 
mechanisms exist, greater use of one mechanism need not result in more effective 
monitoring. When a firm makes greater use of one mechanism, other mechanisms may 
be used less, resulting in equally effective monitoring. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), for instance, employed such an argument to 
understand the lack of positive correlation between the degree of board independence 
and long-term firm performance among U.S. firms. There is also direct evidence that 
firms in the U.S. adjust board composition in response to changes in other governance 
mechanisms. In a study of insurance companies, Mayers et al. (1997) find that these 
companies increase the proportion of outside directors once they cha ge from stock 
ownership to mutual ownership because shares of mutual firms are non-tran ferable, 
which precludes monitoring by institutional shareholders, stock-based in entive 
compensation, and hostile takeovers. As a result of this substitution effect, stronger 
board independence in a U.S. firm need not indicate monitoring effort has increased 
overall. On the other hand, since alternative mechanisms are lacking in China, there will 
likely be no such substitution effect. 
Concentration of ownership. While there is great reliance on independent 
directors to be effective monitors, the ownership structure of Chinese firms will possibly 
impede the performance of such directors. Firms in China are characterized by high 
concentration of ownership by the state. Government agencies own more than 50% of 
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shares in 85% of the listed companies. These agencies often appoint their own 
management and potentially collude with them at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Such large shareholders can also nominate and possibly choose the independent 
directors. Thus, these directors potentially represent the mere interests of the controlling 
agencies and the management. The “independence” of these directors is therefore 
conceivably impaired. 
Poor legal environment.   Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that the fear of 
lawsuits and the concern for reputation induce independent directors to perform their 
duties in a country like the U.S., where the rule of law is prominent and investor 
protection is high. In China, the concept of shareholders rights is a novelty and, in 
general, shareholders lawsuits are hobbled by an unfriendly judicial environment. These 
lawsuits are rare and often dismissed at lower courts. Draft provisions on civil lawsuits 
were enacted only in 2000. Subsequently, in September 2001, however, the Chinese 
Supreme Court issued a notice to temporarily suspend the acceptance of civil lawsuits 
against listed companies due to the lack of precedents. This ban was lifted in early 2002 
but the regulations on how to handle civil compensation cases arising from management 
releasing false information that misled investors did not come into effect until 2003. In 
such a country with low investor protection, it is difficult for shareholders to sue these 
directors. Independent directors in China, therefore, do not face the same level of legal 
consequences as those in countries with high investor protection and their expected 
monetary and reputation costs are much lower. 
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Minority independent board. More independent directors on a board do not 
always constitute an independent board. It is arguable that a board needs to consist of at 
least 50% independent directors to be considered independent of management. In China, 
since the idea of using independent directors as monitors is still ovel, most firms, if 
they have any independent directors at all, have only a minority of independent directors. 
It is possible that while an independent board composed of majority independent 
directors is better able to monitor the earnings process, more ind pendent directors in an 
insider-dominated board might not produce more effective monitoring at all.  
An alternative view is that there is an optimal governance structure. When the 
proportion of independent directors is small, adding more independent directors has 
stronger marginal effect on better monitoring. When there are many independent 
directors already, adding more independent directors might not improve monitoring but 
might even worsen outcomes. The empirical evidence is also mixed. Klein (2002b), for 
example, finds that while boards are effective in lowering earnings management when 
more than 50% of the boards consist of independent directors, the linear association 
between earnings management and the proportion of independent directors in the board 
is weaker. However, in her sample of S&P 500 firms, most have a majority of 
independent directors. Peasnell et al. (1998), on the other hand, find that larger fraction 
of independent directors in the board is associated with lower earnings management in 
their sample of U.K. firms, where the average firm in their sample has a minority of 
independent directors. 
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 Excess demand over supply of independent directors. One idea explaining 
why independent directors are effective monitoring mechanisms is that there ex ts  
market for these directors and they have incentives to signal their expertise to the market 
(Fama and Jensen 1983).  In China, especially after the regulation on board structure is 
effective in 2002, the demand for quality independent directors is enorm us. The 
number of independent directors positions grew from 300 in 2001 to over 3,000 in 2003. 
Since most boards are re-elected every two to three years, independent directors have 
incentives to signal their quality by providing adequate monitoring of t p management. 
However, the sudden increase in demand for independent directors might also have 
negative impacts on monitoring effectiveness because the supply of quality independent 
directors might fail to catch up with this increase in demand after the regulation is in 
place. As such, the effectiveness of the independent directors post regulation is 
questionable. 
Overall hypotheses 
As discussed in the above sub-section, while there are reasons to expect 
independent directors to play an important moni oring role in alleviating the serious 
problem of earnings management in China, there are also reasons to suspect their 
effectiveness. Therefore, whether board independence can, in fact, lessen the practice of 
earnings management in China remains an empiric l question. In this study I utilize two 
definitions of board independence. First, a firm is said to have a more independent board 
if the board comprises more than the regulatory requirement of independent directors. 
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Since the requirement of board structure differs by year, the following null hypothesis is 
tested year by year: 
H1a: Firms with boards that exceed the regulatory requirement of independent 
directors do not experience lower level of earnings management. 
Klein (2002b) shows that firms with higher fraction of independent directors 
experience lower level of earnings management, hence, the second definition of board 
independence in this study uses fraction of independent directors in a board and the 
following null hypothesis is tested: 
 H1b: Firms with higher fraction of independent directors do not experience 
lower levels of earnings management. 
In addition to assessing the cross-sectional difference in earnings management 
for firm-years with different board composition, I also assess directly the effectiveness 
of the regulation on board independence by examining whether firms experience lower 
level of earnings management after the regulation is in place. Hence, I test the following 
null hypothesis: 
H2: There is no difference in the average practice of earnings management 
before and after the 2002 regulation on board independence. 
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III. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS  
Earnings Management Measures  
In this subsection, I discuss the earnings management measures to be used in the 
empirical analyses. In the earnings management literature, accruals are of primary 
interest because accruals are easier to manage than are cash flows. Therefore, the first 
two measures of earnings management capture manager’s discretion over accruals. The 
first accrual measure is based on the Modified-Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) and the 
second accrual measure is based on the relation between accruals change and cash flows 
change (Skinner and Myers 1999). Another stream of earnings management research 
focuses on the distribution and discontinuity of earnings at specific thresholds. In China, 
firms have incentives to manage earnings toward certain thresholds because their listing 
status and equity offering opportunities depend on specific accounting numbers. I u ilize 
these incentives in formulating the third earnings management measure. Each of these 
measures is discussed in detail in the following subsections. 
Discretionary accruals 
Following Jones (1991), Dechow et al. (1995) and Bartov et al. (2000), I first 
measure the degree of earnings management as the absolute value of discretionary 
accruals obtained from the cross-sectional Modified-Jones model. This proxy is designed 
to capture the extent to which management uses discretion over accruals to manipulate 
earnings. I choose the cross-sectional Modified-Jones model for three reasons. First, the 
Jones model has a tendency to measure discretionary accruals with error when 
management exercises discretion in manipulating earnings through revenue recognition. 
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The modified version attempts to remedy this issue by adjusting the change in revenue 
by the change in accounts receivable. The modified version can better capture the extent 
of management discretion in China because there is evidence that Chinese managers 
make use of accrued sales to manage earnings (Aharony et al. 2000). Second, Bartov et 
al. (2000) have tested various times- eries and cross-sectional variations of the Jones and 
Modified-Jones models and conclude that the cross-s cti nal Modified-Jones model has 
the highest power in detecting earnings management in their setting of audit 
qualifications. Third, the Chinese stock market started only in 1990 and data for the 
earlier years is not as readily available as the data in later years. Therefore, sufficient 
observations for the estimation of the time-series model are not available.  
I first calculate total accruals for each firm i in yeart as: 
it it itTA NI OCF= -   (1)  
where NIit is the reported net income for firm i in year t and OCFit is the operating cash 
flows obtained directly from the statement of cash flows for firm i in year t. Unlike many 
countries where cash flow statements are not disclosed in the annual reports, most 
Chinese firms include a cash flow statement where operating cash flows can be directly 
obtained. This facilitates the computation of discretionary accruals, as Hribar and Collins 
(2002) find that accruals are less noisy when estimated directly from operating cash 
flows data.4 
                                                   
4 TA estimated indirectly using the balance sheet tends to be less accurate because operating cash flows 
are estimated with error. The indirect approach is followed in other studies when cash flows statements are 
not available. 
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For each year in which earnings management is hypothesized, I pool all firms by 
industry and estimate the following regression for each industry k t at has at least 20 
observations: 
1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1it it it it
k k k it
it it it it
TA REV REC PPE
A A A A
r r r v
- - - -
æ ö æ ö æ öD - D
= + + +ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷
è ø è ø è ø
  (2) 
where Ait-1 is total assets in year t-1; ÄREVit is the change of revenue from year t-1 to 
year t; ÄRECit is the change in accounts receivable from year t-1 to year t; and PPEit is 
gross property, plant and equipment in year t. 
The residual from (2) is the estimated discretionary accruals (DAit) for firm i in 
year t. The absolute value of DAit is the first measure of earnings management in this 
study.  A non-directional measure of DA is used because Chinese firms can have 
incentives to either smooth earnings or to manage earnings to meet certain thresholds. 
Therefore, directional predictions cannot be made. Computation of |DA| requires lagged 
data. Since data is collected from 2000 to 2003, |DA| is computed for 2001 through 2003.  
The relation between accruals change and cash flows change 
The next measure of earnings management builds on the relationship between 
accruals and cash flows. Dechow (1994) examines this relation and confirms that due to 
the nature of the accrual process, accruals change and cash flows change are negatively 
related. For example, if a firm incurs cash outflows in year t to provide services in year t 
but the cash inflows (customer payment) occur in year t+1, th  matching principle 
requires the r cognition of revenue in year t. Net cash flows in year t is negative but the 
accrual for revenue is positive, which creates a negative relation between accruals and 
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cash flows. Accordingly, the coefficient 1g in the following regssion is expected to be 
negative: 
0 1it it itAccruals Cashflowsg g uD = + D +   (3) 
where itAccrualsD  is defined as 1it it
it
TA TA
Assets
--  for firm i in year t and itCashflowsD  is 
defined as 1it it
it
OCF OCF
Assets
--  for firm i in year t.
Skinner and Myers (1999) and Leuz et al. (2003) apply this relation in an 
earnings management context and argue that a stronger relationship implies greater 
income smoothing. Since firms experiencing unusually high (low) cash flows might 
have incentives to generate income-decreasing (income-increasing) accruals to maintain 
the desired level of earnings, a more negative relation between accruals cha ge and cash 
flows change would be indicative of earnings management.  
Note that the earnings management measure here is not the dependent variable, 
but the relationship between the dependent variable (itAcc ualsD ) and the change in cash 
flows ( itCashflowsD ). Therefore, we would expect the coefficient 2g  to be significantly 
different from zero in the following regression:  
( )0 1 2 *it it it it itAccruals Cashflows Cashflows xg g g uD = + D + D +  (4) 
where x is a factor that influences the degree of earnings management.  
Meeting regulatory thresholds 
The last earnings management measure is developed based on unique incentives 
in China to manage earnings to levels that will allow them to meet the rights issuance 
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and listing requirements. To improve the quality of its capital markets, the Chinese 
government set stringent rules both for initial public offerings and for subsequent right  
issuances. For instance, firms must maintain three years of consecutive profits before 
they can be listed on the exchange. Moreover, firms will be suspended from trading if 
they suffer more than two years of losses. The regulation on subsequent rights issuance 
is also very stringent. For most of our years under consideration (2001-2003), firms have 
to maintain an average ROE of 6% for the past three years before applying for a new 
equity offering.5 Although these stringent rules are intended for improving the quality of 
the Chinese capital markets, they create incentives for firms to manage earnings to meet 
these thresholds. 
An illustration of the extent of earnings management towards certain thresholds 
is shown in Figure 1. For each year, a frequency graph is plotted for all firms with ROE 
between ± 20 percent. Even though there is no requirement since March 2001 to 
maintain 6% ROE for each year (the requirement is a 3-year average ROE of 6%), the 
graphs still show that there are spikes at the 6-7% intervals for all four years. This result 
suggests that Chinese firms engage in income smoothing in anticipation of new equity 
offerings. Furthermore, the incentive to avoid losses is evident as there is an unusually 
low number of firms just below 0% ROE and an unusually large number of firms in the 
0-1% interval. This phenomenon of loss avoidance in China is similar to what has been 
documented in the U.S. (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). 
                                                   
5 From 1996 until March 1999, firms must maintain a ROE of 10% in three consecutive years before 
applying for new rights issues. After March 1999 until March 2001, the CSRC lowers the yearly minimum 
ROE to 6%, but firms still have to maintain a 3 year average ROE of 10%. 
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To formulate my third earnings management measure, I follow the suggestions of 
Healy (1985) and Chen and Yuan (2004). Healy (1985) suggests that managers have 
incentives to manipulate earnings when actual earnings are very close to the target. 
Accordingly, I employ a dummy variable (EM3) that is equal to one for firm-year 
observations where earnings are at a level that is likely to induce earnings management, 
and zero otherwise.  Chen and Yuan (2004) suggest that Chinese firms manipulate non-
operating income to manage earnings to meet certain thresholds.6  Thus, I examine ROE 
before non-operating income around various intervals surrounding the earnings 
thresholds for Chinese firms. Three different ROE intervals surrounding specific 
earnings thresholds are examined: ROE from 1%, 2%, and 3% below the thresholds to 
1%, 2%, and 3% above the thresholds.  
EM3 requires the classification of ROE before and after the inclusion of non-
operating income. The data are obtained from the annual reports of Chin se firms, as 
they are required by the CSRC to report this classification on their annual reports. 
Because EM3 is a discrete dependent variable, logistic regressions are carried out in the 
empirical analyses. 
Board Independence Measures 
Chinese annual reports typically include a list of directors and their affilitions 
with the firms. If a director is independent according to the CSRC guidelines, he/she will 
be labeled as an “independent director” in the annual report. I rely on this classification 
                                                   
6 Chen and Yuan (2004) document relatively poor operating performance subsequent to an equity offering 
for Chinese firms that manage earnings in the pre-equity offering period and that the CSRC has not been 
successful in effectively screening earnings management firms during the approval process. 
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throughout this study. There are two measures for board independence  the empirical 
tests. The first measure IND1 (Voluntary) is a dichotomous variable that takes the value 
of one when a firm has more independent directors on the board than the regulatory 
requirement. Accordingly, a firm-year observation will be coded one in 2001 if it has at 
least one independent director because there is no requirement on the number of 
independent directors in that year. Similarly, a firm-year observation will be coded one 
in 2002 if it has more than the required number of two independent directors and  firm-
year observation will be coded one in 2003 if the fraction of independent directors is 
greater than the regulatory requirement of one-third. The second measure IND2
(Fraction) is a continuous variable measured as the number of independent directors 
divided by total number of directors on the board.  
Control Variables 
Leverage   
Firms that are close to debt covenant violations are more likely to manage 
earnings (Dechow et al. 1996). Leverage is defined as total debt to total equity and is 
used as a proxy for the degree of closeness to violating debt covenants. Leverage is 
hypothesized to be negatively associated with |DA| and higher leverage would accentuate 
the negative relation between accruals change and cash flows change. However, it is not 
clear the direction of association between leverage and EM3. Higher leverage firms are 
poorer firms and they would have higher incentives to manage earnings to avoid losses 
and meet debt covenants.  In contrast, these firms are less likely to manage towards the 6 
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% rights issue threshold because they are probably further away from meeting the target. 
High leverage firms therefore would not have a strong incentive to meet this threshold. 
External financing   
Firms that plan to access the capital markets through initial public offerings 
(IPOs) or seasoned equity offerings have higher incentive to manage earnings (Teoh et 
al. 1998; Aharony et al. 2000; Chen and Yuan 2004). Ideally, this control variable 
should reflect a firm’s intention to access the apital market. The year in which firms 
apply to the CSRC for new equity offerings is the year when they have the highest 
incentives to manage earnings. However, the data on application for new rights are not 
publicly available. To capture the intention of issuing new equity and the timing of 
application, I use the ex-post realization of actual equity offerings as a proxy. This data 
is readily available in the annual reports. I use two constructs to capture this control 
variable. First, I include a dichotomous variable (Rightst) that takes the value of one in 
the year a firm issues new equity and takes the value of zero otherwise. Second, I use 
Rightst+1 as a proxy to allow for timing difference in the application and the actual equity 
offering. 
Growth 
Prior literature has shown that high growth firms are more likely to manage 
earnings because they have strong financing needs (Beneish 1999). Hence, I include a 
variable as a proxy for growth. The variable is defined as one-year sales growth. 
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Firm age  
U.S. studies have shown that younger firms tend to commit GAAP violation 
more than older firms (Beneish 1999). However, studies on Chinese firms have shown 
that older firms are more likely to receive modified audit opinions from their auditors 
because older Chinese firms tend to be less healthy financially (DeFond et al. 1999). 
Firm age measured by the number of years since incorporation is included as another 
control variable. 
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IV. EMPIRICAL TESTS  
I conduct two types of analyses to test the hypotheses developed in S ction II. 
The first set of tests examines cross- ectionally whether firms with higher levels of 
board independence experience lower levels of earnings management. These tests are 
performed year-by-year because the change in regulatory environment on board 
structure might affect the relationship between board independence and earnings 
management. The second set of tests examines the effectiveness of CSRC’s regulation 
on independent director requirements by investigating whether the level of earnings 
management changes after the regulation is in place. 
Cross-sectional Differences in Board Composition and Earnings Management 
To provide evidence on the effect of independent directors on earnings 
management, I begin with a year-by-year cross-sectional analysis.  Statistical analyses 
are performed using each of the three earnings management measures. 
Discretionary accruals and board independence 
To examine the relationship between |DA| a d board independence, I first run an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for each year from 2001 to 2003 as follows: 
0 1 2
3 4
| | * ( ) *
                            * *
it it it
it it it
DA IND m Leverage
SalesGrowth Age
a a a
a a e
= + +
+ + +
 (5) 
where |DA it|  is the absolute value of discretionary accruals s defined in Section III;  
INDit(m) is firm i’s value of board independence proxy measured as either IND1 – the 
dummy variable representing firms with independent directors exceeding regulatory 
requirements (Voluntary), or IND2 – the fraction of independent directors (Fraction); 
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control variables are included in the model if their simple correlation with the dependent 
variable is significant at the 10% level. As a result, leverage, sales growth and age are 
included as control variables. 
In addition, I run the regressions using two-stage least squares (2SLS) method. 
2SLS regression is used as an alternative estimation method when there is a potential 
simultaneity problem between |DA| and INDit(m). Board independence is a choice 
variable and it could be affected by some firm-year outcomes and characteristics. For 
example, Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and Bhagat and Black (2002) find that, in the 
U.S., firms with poor financial performance hire more independent directors. In the 
present analysis of Chinese firms, if the incentive to choose a more independent board is 
affected by a firm’s level of earnings management, then this posits a potential 
simultaneity problem in the above regression. If |DA it| and INDit(m) are simultaneously 
determined, then the OLS estimated coefficients on INDit(m) in (5) will be biased and 
inconsistent. One way of solving the simultaneity problem is to perform a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) analysis. 
Two instruments are used to capture factors that might affect board composition, 
but are likely uncorrelated with the error term in (5). Board size is used as an instrument 
for two reasons. First, the fraction of independent directors is likely to be smaller for 
boards with more members (Klein 2002a).  Second, firms with larger boards presumably 
can afford to invite outside directors to their boards without sacrificing representation of 
the insiders (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). Therefore, Voluntary will depend positively 
on board size. Another instrument used is the percentage shareholding of foreign 
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investors. As the shareholder base becomes more diversified, demand for outside 
representation increases. Moreover, foreign investors are more accustomed to 
independent boards as a governing mechanism; thus, higher level of foreign investor 
shareholdings is likely to be associated with a higher degree of board independence. In 
the first stage of the regression, IND(m) is regressed on these instruments together with 
the control variables used to estimate |DA it|. 
Although one of the endogenous variables (Voluntary) is a dichotomous variable 
and a logistic regression may seem necessary in the first stage regression, Angrist and 
Krueger (2001) explain that using logit to obtain the predicted values in the first stage 
will generate inconsistent estimates if the nonlinear model is not perfectly correct. 
Moreover, the consistency of the second stage estimates can be obtained even if OLS is 
carried out in the first stage with a dichotomous endogenous variable. Therefore, the first 
stage regression is estimated using OLS instead of logistic regression. Formally, the 
2SLS is estimated for each year as follows: 
1 2 3
4 5 6
First stage: ( ) * *%
                   * * *
it it it
it it it it
IND m BoardSize Foreign
Leverage SalesGrowth Age
l l l
l l l x
= + +
+ + + +
 (6) 
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                         * *
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+ + +
 (7) 
Board size is defined as number of directors on the board of firm i in year t; %Foreign is 
total number of shares held by foreign investors divided by total number of shares 
outstanding for firm  in year t; and·( )itIND m is the predicted value from (6). 
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To investigate whether a simultaneity problem exists and whether the 
instruments used are valid instruments, I perform a simultaneity test as well as the 
Hausman test for over-id ntifying restrictions for each year. For the simultaneity test, the 
first stage regression is carried out as in (6). The residuals $ itx are obtained and added to 
the year-by-year regression in (5) to form: 
·
$
0 1 2
3 4 5
| | * ( ) *
                        * * *
it it it
it it itit
DA IND m Leverage
SalesGrowth Age z
a a a
a a a x
= + +
+ + + +
 (8) 
If the coefficient 5a in (8) is significant, it suggests that simultaneity problem exists for 
the year under consideration. In the case that a simultaneity problem does not exist, OLS 
estimate is more efficient than 2SLS estimate. Nonetheless, the 2SLS estimate is 
consistent whether a simultaneity problem exists or not, provided that the instruments 
are valid.  
For the Hausman test for over-identifying restrictions, the 2SLS regression in (6) 
and (7) is performed and the residuals $ ith  re obtained and regressed on the instruments 
and control variables as follows: 
$
0 1 3
4 5 6
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                   * * *
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h q q q
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 (9) 
The R2 is obtained from (9) and multiplied with the number of observations N to form 
the NR2 statistics, which is then compared to 2qc  where q is equal to the number of 
instruments minus the number of endogenous variables under consideration (q=1 in the 
present analysis). If the value of NR2 is large compared to the critical Chi-square value, it 
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indicates that the instruments used are not valid in the sense that they are correlated with 
the error term in (5). In such a case, the 2SLS estimate is inconsistent and cannot be used 
to identify the regression coefficient under consideration. 
Relation between accruals change and cash flows change 
The second cross-sectional test makes use of the negative relation between 
accruals change and cash flows change as a measure of earnings management. As 
earnings management increases, this negative relation should be accentuated. To test the 
relation between board independence and earnings management, the following OLS 
regression is etimated for each year: 
0 1 2
3 4
* * ( * ( ))
                       * ( * ) *( * )
it it it it
it it it it it
Accruals Cashflows Cashflows IND m
Cashflows Leverage Cashflows Rights
g g g
g g u
D = + D + D
+ D + +
 (10) 
1g  is expected to be negative because of the nature of the accrual accounting process. 2g  
is expected to be positive if board independence reduces a firm’s tendency to use 
excessive accruals to smooth income. Both 3g and 4g are expected to be negative if firms 
with higher leverage and capital needs tend to use excessive accruals to conceal cash 
flows shocks.7 
                                                   
7 The above regression could also be viewed as a panel data estimation method that caters for unobserved 
fixed effects. Suppose the structural equation is 
 
( )
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3 4
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Accruals Cashflows Cashflows IND m
Cashflows Leverage Cashflows Rights
d m g g
g g n
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where im  is unobserved firm-specific fixed effect and td  is a time-specific fixed effect. If the unobserved 
firm-specific fixed effect is highly correlated with Cashflows, the estimated coefficients using ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression on the above regression will be biased and inconsistent. To eliminate such 
bias, one could proceed with first-differencing the equations for each firm to obtain consistent estimates of 
the g’s. The regression in (10) therefore provides identification of the g’s, which makes possible the 
analysis of earnings management using this EM2 measure. 
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Meeting regulatory thresholds 
 The third earnings management test examines when firms have specific 
incentives to avoid losses or to mee rights issuance thresholds, whether firms with 
higher board independence are less likely to manage their ROE using non-operat
income. Since there are two distinct thresholds, I first perform the analysis to test for 
earnings management to meet the rights issuance threshold (ROE of 6%). Then, I repeat 
the analysis to test for earnings managements to meet either rights or loss avoidance 
thresholds (i.e. firms are identified as EM firms if they are close to either thresholds and 
manage non- perating income to marginally surpass them).  
 In a univariate analysis, I perform year-by-  Chi-square and Fisher’s exact 
tests to examine the frequency of firms falling into each of the three EM3 intervals (as 
defined in Section III). Second, I run yearly logistic regressions in a multivariate analysis 
to control for other incentives that might induce firms to manage toward the thresholds. 
Logistic regression is used instead of OLS because the dependent variable EM3 is a 
dichotomous variable. In China, higher leverage firms have been found to be less likely 
to use non-operating income to manage towards the rights issuance threshold and firms 
that apply for rights issuance are more likely to use this mechanism (Chen and Yuan, 
2004). Therefore I include both leverage and th proxies for rights application as control 
variables. 
 The logistic regression is estimated as follows: 
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 (11) 
EM3(n)it is firm i’s value of the EM3 metric n in year t, n=1,2,3. 1p  is expected to be 
negative if firms with higher board independence are less likely to fall into the EM 
interval(s). 2p  is also expected to be negative because firms with higher leverage are less 
likely to issue new rights and therefore do not have incentives to manage ROE towards 
the 6% threshold. 3p  and 4p are both expected to be positive because firms that  need to 
offer new equity are those who have the highest incentives to manage earnings to meet 
the threshold. 
 As discussed earlier, there could be simultaneity problems with the earnings 
management and the board independence measures. To n  that the results are not 
plagued by a simultaneity problem, I also perform a 2SLS analysis similar to the one 
performed using discretionary accruals. Because EM3 is a dichotomous variable, I also 
perform a non-li ear two-stage least square technique (N2SLS), where I use logistic 
regression in the second-stage regression. Angrist and Krueger (2001), however, explain 
that such N2SLS requires a correctly specified functional form in order to interpret the 
estimates easily. 2SLS, on the other hand, is robust and could capture the average effect 
of interest even if the underlying second-stage relationship is non-li ear. 
Mandatory Requirement of Independent Directors and Earnings Management 
A motivation for this study is to examine whether mandatory requirements for 
independent directors inhibits listed firms’ practice of managing earnings. So far, the 
tests have been designed to examine the cross-sectional difference in earnings 
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management when the degree of board independence differs. In this section, I use the 
Chow test to assess the difference in earnings management before and after the 
regulation on board structure is in place.  
First, I estimate the pooled regression for 2001 (pre-regulation) and 2002 (post 
regulation) using |DAit| as the dependent variable as follows: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
| | * * 01 * * 01 * * 01
            * * 02 * * 02 * * 02
it it it it
it it it it
DA Leverage Y SalesGrowth Y Age Y
Leverage Y SalesGrowth Y Age Y
j j j j
j j j h
= + + +
+ + + +
 (12) 
where Y01 is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one when the year is 2001 
and is equal to zero otherwise. Similarly, Y02 takes the value of one when the year is 
2002 and is equal to zero otherwise. All other variables are defined in the earlier 
sections. Next, I estimate equation (12) separately for 2001 and 2002 without year 
dummies. The intercept in the pooled regression represents the average |DAit| after 
controlling for leverage, sales growth and age and it is assumed to be equal between 
2001 and 2002, while the yearly regressions allow for the intercepts to differ. The Chow 
test examines whether the intercepts are indeed different by comparing the residual sum 
of errors of the pooled regression with the residual sum of errors of the yearly 
regressions combined. A significant F-statistic will imply that the intercepts are different 
and that the average |DAit| is different in 2001 and 2002. 
While the above test examines whether the average |DAit| for the overall sample 
has changed or not, another sample of interest consists of the firms that do not have any 
independent directors prior to the regulation on independent directors, i.e. the mandatory 
change firms. To investigate whether these firms have lower earnings management post 
  
33
 
regulation, I repeat the Chow test by including a Voluntarypre*Y01 interaction variable in 
the regressions, where Voluntarypre equals one if a firm has independent directors prior to 
the regulation and is equal to zero otherwise. The intercepts of these regressions 
represent the average |DAit| for mandatory firms. 
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V. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION  
Data 
The sample consists of A-share firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange or 
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Data are hand collected from the firms’ annual reports, 
which are available on the website of China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(www.csrc.org.cn), the website of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (www.sse.com.cn), and 
an information website www.cnlist.com. The CSRC website contains annual reports 
from 2001 to 2003 for firms listed on both exchanges. The Shanghai Stock Exchange 
website contains annual reports from 2000 to 2003 for firms listed on their exchange. 
The information website www.cnlist.com contains annual reports from 1999 to 2003 for 
firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Since the annual reports do not include 
industry codes, I collect for each firm the industry classification from www.cnlist.com. 
Firms are manually classified by a two level industry code, similar in spirit to the two 
digit SIC code. To be included in the sample, a firm must have board of directors 
information and financial information for computation of at least one earnings 
management measure. Data on board composition and financial variables are available 
through these annuals reports. The final sample consists of 3,643 firm-year observations 
for the fiscal years 2000 to 2003. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the number of observations by year as well as 
descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Firms that adopt independent directors pre-
regulation (voluntary firms) have mean and median asset values of $4,195 million and 
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$1,449 million, which are higher than the mean ($1,886 million) and median  ($1,285 
million) assets of firms that employ independent directors post regulation (mandatory 
firms) at 1% level. Since voluntary firms have more assets than mandatory firms, all 
financial variables are scaled by firm size proxies to control for any size effect. Average 
leverage ratio is very similar between voluntary firms (1.09) and mandatory firms (0.91) 
and statistically not significantly different from each other. The leverage ratio of Chinese 
firms is smaller than an average U.S. firm because the Chinese bond market is largely 
undeveloped and the main source of debt financing is through bank loans. Average one-
year sales growth of voluntary and mandatory firms is 25.19% and 24.1% respectively, 
which are comparable (p-value of 0.6834). 
ROE before non-operating income is on average smaller than ROE after non-
operating income, which is an indication that firms could be managing net income 
upwards using on-operating items.  In the overall sample, median ROE before non-
operating income is just below 6% but ROE after non-op rating income just exceeds 
6%, which coincides with the incentive to manage ROE above the rights issuance 
requirement. This phenomenon is also observed with the mandatory firms, but not with 
the voluntary firms. Absolute value of discretionary accruals has a mean and median 
value of 0.079 and 0.046 respectively. Contrary to expectation, voluntary firms have 
higher discretionary accruals (0.090) than mandatory firms (0.074). Prior literature on 
board composition suggests (Hermalin and Weisbach 1988; Bhagat and Black 2002) that 
firms with poor financial performance tend to hire more independent directors. If firms 
with more severe earnings management have the same tendency to move toward board 
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independence, then it may explain the relatively high discretionary accruals among 
voluntary firms. At the same time, this is also an indication of potential simultaneity 
problems between the earnings management proxy and the partitioning variable since 
firms with higher discretionary accruals may choose to hire more independent directors 
and board independence may in turn affect the level of earnings management. I address 
the potential simultaneity problem in the next section. 
Panel B of Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for board structure by year. The 
variation in the number of independent directors across years reflects changes in 
regulatory requirements of board of directors in this period. The median number of 
independent directors increases from zero in 2000 and 2001 to two independent directors 
in 2002, and further increases to three independent directors in 2003. The percentage of 
firms having at least one independent director on their boards jumps from 4% in 2000 to 
almost 90% in 2003. The fraction of independent directors on the board also increases 
from 1% to 32% in the corresponding period. This trend corresponds to China’s change 
in regulatory requirement as discussed in Section II. The change in regulatory 
requirement has created more than 3,000 independent director positions in two years. 
Although the fraction of independent directors has increased substantially from 2000 to 
2003 in China, it is still less than the average fraction of indepe dent directors in U.S. 
firms. For example, Beasley (1996) finds that the average board for U.S. firms consists 
of more than 50% of outside directors. 
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VI. RESULTS 
Discretionary Accruals and Board Independence 
Ordinary least squares 
To provide evidenc  on the effectiveness of board independence in inhibiting 
earnings management, I begin with a year-by-year cross-section analysis using 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management. Prior literature suggests that 
board independence is negativ ly associated with discretionary accruals in the U.S. and 
U.K. (Peasnell et al. 1998; Klein 2002b). There is also evidence that firms in China 
manage earnings through accruals (Aharony et al. 2000), however, there is little 
evidence that the Modified Jones model is successful in capturing earnings management 
using Chinese data (Chen and Yuan 2004). 
Table 2 and Table 3 report the results of regressing discretionary accruals on 
board independence, controlling for leverage, sales growth and age. The first column for 
each yearly regression in Table 2 presents the OLS results using voluntary adoption of 
independent directors to surpass regulatory requirement (Voluntary) as the measure of 
board independence. Similarly, the first column for each yearly regression in Table 3 
presents the OLS results using the fraction of independent directors in the board as the 
measure of board independence.  
The estimated coefficients on leverage and sales growth are positive and 
significant at 1% in 2001 whether Voluntary or Fraction is used as the measure of board 
independence. Sales growth is positive and significant at 5% in 2002. This implies firms 
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with higher leverage and sales growth tend to manage earnings, which is consistent with 
prior literature (Beneish 1999; Klein 2002b).  
The OLS estimates of our coefficients of interest are, however, not significantly 
different from zero. The coefficients on Voluntary in Table 2are insignificant in all three 
years when OLS is used as the estimation method. Similarly, the OLS estimatd 
coefficients on Fraction in Table 3are insignificant across years. These results suggest 
that higher board independence is not associated with lower level of earnings 
management. However, there might exist a simultaneity problem between discretionary 
accruals and board independence, which leads to biased and inconsistent OLS 
estimation. 
Simultaneity problem and two-stage least squares regression 
To address the potential simultaneity problem, I perform a 2SLS regression to 
examine whether board independenc  is associated with lower earnings management, 
after instrumenting for board independence. The 2SLS results are presented in the 
second column for each yearly regression in Table 2 and Table 3. As discussed in 
Section IV, I use board size and percentage of foreign investors shareholdings as 
instruments for the board independence variables.  
Having instrumented for Voluntary in the first stage regression, the second stage 
results in Table 2 show, in contrast to the OLS estimate, that Voluntary s a negative (-
0.1113) and significant (p-value of 0.0007) coefficient in 2001, suggesting that as a firm 
voluntarily includes independent directors on its board prior to the regulatory change on 
board composition, it will experience lower levels of discretionary ac uals.  However, 
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the 2SLS estimated coefficients of Voluntary in 2002 and 2003 both remain 
insignificant, indicating that after independent directors are made mandatory, hiring 
more than what the law requires does not lead to lower earnings management. Likewise, 
when Fraction is included in the regression in Table 3 instead of Voluntary, the 2SLS 
estimated coefficient of Fraction in 2001 becomes negative (-0.6321) and significant (p-
value of 0.0013), but no such relationship is found in 2002 and 2003.  
The results of the Hausman’s test of over-identifying restrictions (as discussed in 
Section IV) in Table 2 show that the instruments used are valid in the sense that they are 
uncorrelated with the error term in the second stage regression, when Voluntary is used 
as the board independence measure. Therefore, the 2SLS estimates in Table 2 are 
consistent. Moreover, the simultaneity test demonstrates that discretionary accruals and 
board independence are simultaneously determined in 2001. This means that the OLS 
estimate for 2001 is in fact biased and inconsistent. The 2SLS estimation remedies such 
simultaneity problems and finds a significantly negative coefficient on Voluntary in 
2001. The Hausman test results in Table 3 also show that the 2SLS estimate is consistent 
for 2001, when Fraction is used as the board independence measure. The simultaneity 
test again rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity of board independence in 2001. 
Therefore, OLS estimates for 2001 are biased and inconsistent, whereas the 2SLS 
finding of a significantly negative coefficient on Frac i  is consistent.8 
 
                                                   
8 The simultaneity test cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of board independence in 2002 and 
2003, whether Voluntary or Fraction is used as the measure of board independence. This implies that OLS 
estimation is consistent. Moreover, OLS estimate is more efficient than 2SLS estimate in these cases. 
However, whether OLS or 2SLS is used, the coefficient of interest is statistically insignificant. 
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Endogenous determination of board independence 
Although the present paper is mainly interested in whether higher board 
independence leads to lower earnings management in China, the s multanei y issue gives 
rise to another interesting question of whether firms with higher earnings management 
choose to have more independent board members in China.  
Table 4 presents the regression results on how the level of discretionary accruals 
affects board composition. In the second stage of the 2SLS, the estimated coefficient on 
the predicted |DA  is 1.2817 and significant at 5% level in 2001. The result is similar 
with the N2SLS estimate using logistic regression at the second stage. The positive 
coefficient suggests that firms with higher |DA| tend to voluntarily include independent 
directors on their board prior to the regulation on independent directors requirement. 
Besides, higher |DA  is associated with a larger fraction of independent directors for 
2001. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients on the predicted |DA| in 2002 and 
2003 are insignificant, regardless of either board independence proxy used, which, in 
line with the results in the above subsection, suggests that there is no simultaneity 
problem between |DA| and the measures of board independence post regulation.  
Relationship of Accruals Change and Cash Flows Change and Board Independence 
Dechow (1994) suggests that accruals change and cash flows change are 
negatively related. Leuz t al. (2003) and Skinner and Myers (1999) interpret a stronger 
negative relation between accruals change and cash flow change as indicative of more 
severe income smoothing because firms use excessive accruals to conceal cash flow 
shocks. In this subsection, I test in a regression framework how board independence 
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affects this relation, controlling for other factors such as leverage and rights issuance that 
might also influence earnings management. 
Table 5 reports the OLS results. In all years, the estimated coefficient on cash 
flows change is negative and significant, in accordance with Dechow (1994). The 
variable of interest in Panel A of Table 5 is the change in the interaction between cash 
flows and Voluntary. If board independence can effectively inhibit earnings 
management, we should observe a positive coefficient on the interaction of the changes 
in [Cash flows*Voluntary]. The coefficient on the interaction term is significantly 
positive (coefficient of 0.65039 and p-v lue of <0.0001) only in 2001 but not in 2002 
and 2003, which suggests that voluntarily employing independent directors prior to the 
regulatory requirements resulted in less earnings management. Similar to the results for 
|DA|, in 2002 and 2003, surpassing the regulatory requirement of independent directors 
shows no association with lower earnings management.  When the fraction of 
independent directors is used as a proxy for board independence, presented in Panel B of 
Table 5, the coefficient on the interaction term of the changes in [Cash flows*Fraction] 
is positive and significant in 2001. The coefficient is not significant in 2002 and even 
becomes negative in 2003. 
Earnings Management to Meet Regulatory Thresholds 
The third measure of earnings management that I use relies on unique regulatory 
environment in China to reach certain earnings thresholds in order to fulfill requirements 
for rights issuances and security listings.   
 
  
42
 
Univariate tests 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the results of the univariate tests on the earnings 
management of ROE to meet the 6% threshold for rights issuance between voluntary and 
non-voluntary firms. When earnings management is defined as firms managing ROE 
before non-operating income from 1% below the 6% threshold to 1% above the 6% 
threshold (ROE ± 1%), none of the 70 voluntary firms (0%) in 2000 falls into this EM 
category, whereas 31 out of 918 (3.38%) non-voluntary firms manage non-operating 
income to meet this threshold. However, notwithstanding the seeming difference, neither 
the Chi-square test nor the Fisher’s exact test finds the difference to be significant at the 
10% level.9 Similarly, in 2001, only 4 out of 324 (1.23%) voluntary firms fall into the 
EM category versus 22 out of 767 (2.87%) non-volu tary firms, however, the difference 
is not significant at conventional levels. Since inferences from the univariate tests could 
be rendered imprecise when there are too few observations in some cells of the 2x2 
table, I perform univariate tests by pooling observations for the years prior to the 
regulation on independent directors (2000 and 2001 combined) as well as for the post 
regulation years (2002 and 2003 combined). When the tests are performed for the years 
prior to the regulation (2000 and 2001 combined), voluntary firms are less likely to be in 
the EM category and the difference is significant at the 5% level. However, there is no 
significant difference between voluntary and non-voluntary firms in the post regulation 
                                                   
9 The Chi-square test is the most frequently used test for such 2x2 tables. However, when one of the cells 
of the 2x2 table has fewer than 5 observations, or when the distribution within the sample is very 
unbalanced, the Chi-square test, which is an asymptotic result, tends to give imprecise finite sample 
inferences. Because of this, I also report the Fisher’s exact test statistic, which is another commonly used 
statistic for these finite sample situations. That said, in most of the present results, the Chi-square te t and 
the Fisher’s exact test give similar inference. 
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sample (2002 and 2003 combined). When EM is defined as ROE ± 2% or ROE ± 3% 
around the 6% threshold, none of the univariate test results is significant for any year. 
However, the p-values of the tests for the sample prior to regulation are much lower than 
those for the sample post regulation. 
Because firms have an incentive to manage earnings to meet the 6% threshold for 
rights issuance, as well as to avoid losses, Panel B of Table 6 examines the 6% threshold 
together with the 0% threshold. Moreover, the finite sample proble  of the univariate 
tests will be less severe when there are more observations in the cells of interest. In 
2000, none of the 70 voluntary firms (0%) falls within the EM interval of ± 1% around
either threshold, whereas 37 out of 918 (4.03%) non-voluntary firms manage non-
operating income to meet these thresholds. The Chi-square test gives a p-value of 
0.0869, which is marginally significant at the 10% level. In 2001, only 7 out of 324 
(2.16%) voluntary firms fall into the EM category versus 35 out of 767 (4.56%) non-
voluntary firms. The difference is significant at the 10% level, whether the Chi-square 
test or the Fisher’s exact test is used.  In fact, in 2001, voluntary firms are less likely to 
be classified as an EM firm whether the EM interval is ± 1%, ± 2%, or± 3%, at 
significance levels of 10% or better. In the combined pre-regulation years, voluntary 
firms are less likely to manage non-operating income to meet thresholds when the EM 
interval is ± 1% and ± 2%, at significance levels of 5% or better. When the ± 3% 
interval is employed, most of the test results indicate no significant difference in 
earnings management between voluntary and non-voluntary firms. 
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Logistic regressions  
The above univariate tests do not control for other incentives to manage toward 
regulatory thresholds. In this subsection, I use multivariate logistic regressions to 
analyze independent board effectiveness together with other control variables that proxy 
for firms’ incentives to manage earnings to meet thresholds. Since the incentive to avoid 
negative income is different from the incentive to meet the rights issuance threshold 
(average ROE of 6%), I first define EM as firms managing non-operating income to 
meet the rights issuance threshold because this definition will allow for a larger sample 
for analysis than using the sample for loss avoidance. Table 7 presents the multivariate 
regression results with Voluntary as the board independence measure and Table 8 
presents the results with Fraction as the independent variable. Panel A presents the year-
by-year results with EM interval of ± 1%. The first column shows results from a logistic 
regression, the second column of results are from a non-linear tw  stage least squares 
(N2SLS) regression, and the third column results are from a two stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression. Rightst has a significantly positive coefficient in 2000 and 2001, and 
Rightst+1 has a significantly positive coefficient in 2002. As for leverage, it is only 
significant and negative in 2002 when EM is defined as ROE ± 2% around the 
threshold. The variables of interest, Voluntary and Fraction, however, are not significant 
in any of the logistic regressions across years. Similar to the simultaneity problem 
observed when discretionary accruals are used as the EM measure, EM3 and board 
independence could also be determined simultaneously.  
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To address the simultaneity problem, I perform a N2SLS regression and a 2SLS 
regression using Board Size and %Foreign as instruments. The second stage results are 
shown in the second and third columns for each year nd EM interval. After accounting 
for the simultaneity problem between the proxies for board independence and EM3, the 
regression results show that both Voluntary and Fraction are negatively associated with 
EM3 in 2001. Panels A and B in Table 7 show that when EM3 is defined as ROE ±  1%
or ROE ±  2% around the threshold, voluntary firms are less likely to be classified as an 
EM firm with an estimated coefficient of –0.1195 (p-value of 0.0165) and an estimated 
coefficient of –0.1365 (p-value of 0.0414) in the 2SLS regressions. Results under the 
N2SLS regressions are also similar. Likewise, Table 8 shows that the estimated 
coefficients on Fraction are negative and significant with coefficients of –0.5319 (p-
value of 0.0440) and –0.6910 (p-value 0.0512) in 2001 when EM3 is measured as ROE 
± 1% and ± 2% around the threshold under the 2SLS estimation method. No such 
relationship is observed in 2002 or 2003.  
Tables 7 and 8 also report the simultaneity test results for each 2SLS regression. 
Similar to the test results in discretionary accruals, the board independence proxies and 
EM3 are determined simultaneously in 2001 (± 1% and ± 2%) but not in 2002 and 2003 
as evident by the significant coefficients on the residual from the simultaneity test in 
2001 but insignificant coefficients in 2002 and 2003. Therefore the logistic estimates are 
biased in 2001. The results of the Hausman’s test of over-identifying restrictions indicate 
that the instruments are valid in all of the 2SLS regressions. Therefore, the estimates on 
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Voluntary and Fraction for all years and intervals are consistent under the 2SLS 
regressions. 
Table 9 and Table 10 summarize the results on the multivariate tests considering 
both the rights issuance and the loss avoidance thresholds. Since simultaneity is not a 
problem in 2001 as the simultaneity test cannot reject exogeneity between EM3 and the 
proxies for board independence, the logistic regression estimates are consistent. The 
coefficients on Voluntary are negative and significant in all three EM intervals and the 
coefficient on Fraction is negative but insignificant. Again, the coefficients of interest
are insignificant for 2002 and 2003, whichever method of estimation is used. 
Implications from the Cross-sectional Tests 
In summary, firms that voluntarily include independent directors prior to the 
regulation have lower levels of |DA|, experience less i com  smoothing, and are less 
likely to use non- perating income to manage ROE to meet specific thresholds. In 
contrast, firms that hiring more than the required levels of independent directors post-
regulation do not experience any difference in any of the earnings management 
measures.  
These results have the two potential implications. First, independent directors 
seem to be useful only when firms voluntarily choose to adopt them on their board. 
Firms have higher incentives to maintain the proper functioning of independent directors 
on the board if firms are resolute to better monitor management, or they desire to 
increase the confidence of investors, especially foreign investors, in the credibility of the 
firms’ disclosure practice.  This explains the effec iv ness of independent directors in the 
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pre-regulation period. When firms are required by law to implement board 
independence, the incentive to maintain a proper functioning independent board is 
weaker among the non-voluntary firms, which can explain the significant result in the 
post regulation period. Moreover, the demand for independent directors increases 
substantially after the regulation is in effect. The number of independent director 
positions increases from 300 in 2001 to more than 3,000 in 2003. As in any other 
profession, experience is an important factor in determining the quality of independent 
directors, therefore the effectiveness of the newly appointed independent directors after 
the regulation may not be able to provide effective monitor ng. This can explain the 
insignificant result on Fraction in the post regulation period because the quality of these 
independent directors is likely to be lower. 
The second implication could be that once firms reach a minimal level of board 
independence, adding more independent directors do not lead to more effective 
monitoring. This would explain why hig er board independence in the pre-regulatory 
period is associated with lower levels of earnings management because most firms in 
2000 and 2001 do not have any independent directors and adding at least one 
independent member to the board will result in effective monitoring. However, once the 
regulation requires certain level of board independence, adding more than the 
requirement in the post-regulatory period does not result in higher monitoring 
effectiveness. 
To address which implication is more plausible, I examine the changes in the 
levels of earnings management before and after the law is in effect. If there is significant 
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difference in the levels of earnings management for firms that employ independent 
members after the law is in effect, it is likely that a board with minimal level of 
independence is sufficient for monitoring top management. In contrast, if there is no 
significant difference, reaching the minimal level of board independence is not sufficient 
for more effective monitoring. This would support the explanation that independent 
directors are only effective when firms have the incentives to ensure their proper 
functioning. 
Change in Discretionary Accruals before and after the Regulation 
Panel A of Table 11 presents results, for the overall sample, on the change in the 
levels of earnings management before and after the regulation is in place, using |DA| as 
the measure of earnings management. Regr ssion analyses is performed for 2001, 2002 
and the pooled sample respectively. Coefficients for the control variables are allowed to 
be different in the pooled regression. The intercepts in 2001 and 2002 represent the 
average l vels of  |DA| after controlling for leverage, sales growth and age. I perform the 
Chow test and examine whether the intercept is different between 2001 and 2002. The F 
statistic has a value of 1.1341 (p-value of 0.2871), which implies there is no significant 
difference in the averg  level of |DA| between 2001 and 2002.  
Panel B of Table 11 reports the results on the difference in |DA| for firms that 
employ independent directors only after the law is in effect. Since 2002 is the first year 
that these firms include independent directors on their boards, testing the difference in 
|DA| for this subsample allows a direct test of the effectiveness of the regulation. In 
2001, the regression has an estimated value of 0.0781 for the average |DA| of mandatory 
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firms (the intercept of that regression) and in 2002, the regression gives a corresponding 
estimated value of 0.08, whereas in the pooled sample, such intercept takes the value of 
0.07884. Result from the Chow test indicates that there is no difference in the average 
level of |DA| for these firms pre- and post- regulation period (F-value of 0.0562 and p-
value of 0.8127). 
Results from this section confirm that the law is ineffective in inhibiting earnings 
management. Potentially, firms with mandatory independent directors employ these 
members simply to satisfy the regulatory requirements and have no desire to improve 
their corporate governance structure. Another explanation is that the changes in 
regulation imposes tremendous burden onto firms to search for independent members for 
their boards in a market where quality independent directors are scarce. The result is that 
overall monitoring effectiveness becomes lower than before the regulation is in effect. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
The empirical results of the present study of China demonstrate that independent 
directors could be effective in curtailing the practice of earnings management in firms 
even in a country with drastically different institutional and legal environment from the 
U.S. and the U.K. The cross-sectional results for the pre-regulation period are consistent 
and robust across different measures of earnings management and corroborate that firms 
with stronger board independence experience lower earnings management. As many 
countries around the world are following the footsteps of the U.S. and U.K. in 
encouraging firms to adopt independent directors as a monitoring mechanism, this 
finding is important.   
The empirical results also confirm that independent directors are effective in 
monitoring managers to reduce earnings management in China eve  when these 
directors represent a minority of the board, which contrasts with the results from the U.S. 
where a majority independent board is crucial to effective monitoring (Klein 2002b). 
However, this finding is pertinent only to firms that voluntarily employ independent 
directors prior to the board independence regulation in 2002.  After 2002, neither 
implementing a minimum level of independent directors nor exceeding the regulatory 
requirements would lead to lower earnings management. The implication is that 
independent boards are supposed to be a market solution to some agency problems and 
firms that find the needs to employ this mechanism voluntarily have the incentives to 
maintain well-functioned independent boards. Therefore, regulation on independent 
directors requirement is not a sufficient solution to improve board of directors’ 
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monitoring effectiveness. Moreover, such regulatory pressure might generate excessive 
demand for independent directors over supply and lower the quality of independent 
directors. This finding is again important in light of the global trend toward a more 
prominent role of independent directors as a monitoring mechanism in firms.  
In terms of empirical strategy, the current research is innovative in accounting for 
the simultaneity problem between board independence and earnings management. The 
study finds that failing to cater for the simultaneity problem between independent boards 
and earnings management would lead to estimates that are biased and inconsistent. It is 
found that higher earnings management firms tend to choose a more independent board 
in China. Therefore, a reduced-form regression without accounting for the simultaneity 
problem produces biased and inconsistent estimate that confounds the effect of board 
independence on earnings management in China. This confirms the concern that the 
problems of joint endogeneity often plague the results of board studies and failing to 
address this issue would generate results that are difficult to interpret (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 2003). 
This study could be extended in a number of ways. Although the present inquiry 
finds that regulation on board independence fails to put a restrain on the practice of 
earnings management in China, regulators could have other objectives, such as inhibiting 
illegal wealth transfer by top management and protecting minority shareholders from the 
expropriation by major shareholders, when implementing the regulation. Therefore, the 
study of earnings management is not a comprehensive measure of the success of the 
board independence regulation. Future research on other aspects of independent 
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directors’ monitoring role will shed more light on the effectiveness of this regulation. 
Furthermore, independent directors might suffer from a learning curve, especially for 
those who started after 2002 and possess limited experience in the monitoring role. The 
period covered by this study does not allow a thorough analysis of any lag effects that 
independent directors might have in reducing earnings management post re ulation. 
Further research is therefore warranted. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics on Financial Variables 
 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics on Board variables  
 
Variable definition: 
Return on Equity is calculated as net incomeit/equityit for firm i in year t; Return on Equity before non-operating items is calculated as (net incomeit -
non-operating incomeit)/ quityit for firm i in year t; Debt to equity ratio is calculated as total debtit /equityit for firm i in year t, where total debt includes 
short term debt and long term debt; one year sales growth is calculated as revenuet-revenue t-1/revenue t-1 for firm i in year t, where revenue is gross 
revenue from core operation. 
Firms with independent Firms with independentTest of Difference (two-tailed)
2000 - 2003 directors before regulation directors after regulation p-value
Wilcoxon-
n Mean Median n Mean Median n Mean Median T-test Rank Sums test
Return on Equity 3643 -2.56% 6.17% 963 -5.44% 6.44% 2570 -1.90% 6.03% 0.5575 0.0013
Return on Equity before non operating items3612 -2.43% 5.33% 954 -5.52% 6.02% 2548 -1.71% 4.92% 0.5076 <0.0001
Assets (in millions) 3642 2,569.00$ 1,314.00$ 963 4,195.00$ 1,449.00$ 2569 1,886.00$ 1,285.00$ <0.0001 <0.0001
Debt to Equity Ratio 3643 0.95 0.54 963 1.09 0.52 2570 0.91 0.55 0.1540 0.3752
One year Sales Growth 3643 24.38% 13.84% 963 25.19% 13.83% 2570 24.10% 13.21% 0.6834 0.4072
n Mean Median n Mean Median n Mean Median n Mean Median
Number of Directors 401 9.60 9 1048 9.40 9 1106 9.90 9 1102 9.90 9
Number of Independent directors 401 0.18 0 1048 0.54 0 1106 2.30 2 1102 3.18 3
Fraction of Independent directors on Board401 1.95% 0% 1048 6.00% 0% 1106 24% 22% 1102 32% 33%
Number of firms with 401 76 1048 214 1106 1067 1102 1092 1092
      at least one independent director
Number of firms with 401 76 1048 214 1106 309 1102 265
      number/fraction of directors exceeding
      regulatory requirement
20032000 2001 2002
  
59
 
 
 
Table 2 
Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Discretionary Accruals 
Using Voluntary as a Proxy for Board Independence 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 1% level (two-tail d), respectively. 
aOLS regression:  
0 1 2 3 4| | * * * *it it it it it itDA Voluntary Leverage SalesGrowth Agea a a a a e= + + + + +  
b2SLS regression: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6
* | | * * % * *
*
it it it it it it
it it
Voluntary DA Boardsize Foreign Leverage SalesGrowth
Age
l l l l l l
l x
= + + + + +
+ +
·
0 1 2 3 4| | * * * *it it it it it itDA Voluntary Leverage SalesGrowth Agej j j j j h= + + + + +  
cSimultaneity test: 
·0 1 2 3 4 5| | * * * * *it it it it it it itDA Voluntary Leverage SalesGrowth Age za a a a a a x= + + + + + +$  
dHausman test: 
$ 0 1 2 3 4 5* *% * * *it it it it it it itBoardsize Foreign Leverage SalesGrowth Ageh q q q q q q z= + + + + + +  
Variable definitions: 
|Discretionary Accruals| (|DAit|) is calculated as |itv | from the following cross-sectional, industry specific regression:  
1 2 3
1 1 1 1
1
it it it it
k k k it
it it it it
TA REV REC PPE
A A A A
r r r v
- - - -
D - D
= + + +
æ ö æ ö æ ö
ç ÷ ç ÷ ç ÷è ø è ø è ø
where TAit is calculated as the difference between NIit and 
OCFit; NIit is net income; OCFit is operating cash flows obtained directly from the cash flows statement; Ait-1 is total 
assets in year t-1; ÄREVit is the change of revenue from year t-1 to year t; ÄRECit is the change in accounts receivable 
from year t-1 to year t; and PPEit is gross property, plant and equipment. Voluntaryjt is a dichotomous variable that 
takes the value of one when firm i has more independent directors on the board than the regulat ry requirem nt in year 
t. Leverageit is calculated as total debt / total equity of firm i in year t. Sales growthit is calculated as (ÄREVit- ÄREVit-
1)/ ÄREVit-1 for firm i in year t. Ageit is the number of years incorporated up to year t of firm i. Board sizeit is the 
number of directors for firm i in year t. %Foreignit is the total number of shares held by foreign investors / total 
number outstanding shares for firm i in year 1. 
OLSa 2SLSb OLSa 2SLSb OLSa 2SLSb
Dependent Variable |DA| |DA| |DA| |DA| |DA| |DA|
Intercept 0.0479 0.0781 0.0646 0.0754 0.05213 0.3506
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0138) (0.1127)
Voluntary 0.0010 -0.1113 *** -0.0105 -0.0508 -0.0071 -1.0576
(0.9049) (0.0007) (0.1510) (0.1931) (0.6975) (0.1721)
Leverage 0.0055 *** 0.0590 *** -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0048 -0.0004
(0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.6165) (0.4921) (0.1056) (0.9336)
Sales Growth 0.0192 *** 0.024 *** 0.0110 ** 0.0124 ** -0.0001 -0.0156
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0363) (0.0221) (0.9888) (0.3018)
Age 0.0016 0.0019 * 0.0007 0.0008 0.0026 -0.0025
(0.1122) (0.0650) (0.4289) (0.3642) (0.2180) (0.5558)
N 517 517 571 571 575 575
Adjusted R2 5.86% 7.94% 0.51% 0.45% 0.10% 0.40%
First stage results:
Adjusted R2 5.45% 3.01% -0.46%
F value 6.95 *** 4.54 *** 0.48
(<0.0001) (0.0005) (0.7917)
Simultaneity Test c results:
Residuals 0.1191 0.04184 1.0511
(0.0004) (0.2924) (0.1752)
Hausman Test d results:
N*R2 Statistics 0.0517 0.6852 1.9550
(0.8201) (0.4078) (0.1620)
2001 2002 2003
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Table 3 
Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Discretionary Accruals 
Using Fraction as a Proxy for Board Independence 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 1% level (two-tail d), respectively. 
aOLS regression:  
0 1 2 3 4| | * * * *it it it it it itDA Fraction Leverage SalesGrowth Agea a a a a e= + + + + +  
b2SLS regression: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6
* | | * *% *
* *
it it it it it
it it it
Fraction DA Boards ze Foreign Leverage
SalesGrow h Age
l l l l l
l l x
= + + + +
+ + +
·0 1 2 3 4| | * * * *it it it it it itDA Fraction Leverage SalesGrowth Agej j j j j h= + + + + +  
cSimultaneity test: 
·0 1 2 3 4 5| | * * * * *it it it it it it itDA Fraction Leverage SalesGrowth Age za a a a a a x= + + + + + +$  
dHausman test: 
0 1 2 3 4 5* *% * * *it it it it it it itBoardsize Foreign Leverage SalesGrowth Ageh q q q q q q z= + + + + + +$  
Variable definitions: 
Fraction is calculated as number of independent directors/number of directors for firm i in year t. 
All other variables are defined as in Table 2.
OLSa 2SLSb OLSa 2SLSb OLSa 2SLSb
Dependent Variable |DA| |DA| |DA| |DA| |DA| |DA|
Intercept 0.0469 0.0834 0.0684 0.0447 0.0433 0.0046
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1050) (0.3485) (0.9832)
Fraction 0.0221 -0.6321 *** -0.0272 0.0703 0.0208 0.1388
(0.5195) (0.0013) (0.5243) (0.5171) (0.8689) (0.8328)
Leverage 0.0055 *** 0.0062 *** -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0048 0.0048
(0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.6558) (0.6473) (0.1029) (0.1024)
Sales Growth 0.0190 *** 0.0252 *** 0.0107 ** 0.0104 ** 0.0000 -0.0001
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0413) (0.0484) -0.9965 (0.9927)
Age 0.0016 0.0019 * 0.0007 0.0007 0.0026 0.0026
(0.1134) (0.0670) (0.4511) (0.4410) (0.2105) (0.2064)
N 517 517 571 571 575 575
Adjusted R2 5.93% 7.75% 0.22% 0.22% 0.08% 0.08%
First stage results:
Adjusted R2 2.65% 14.84% 2.86%
F value 3.80 *** 20.87 *** 4.38 ***
(0.0022) (<0.0001) (0.0006)
Simultaneity Test c results:
Residuals 0.6747 *** -0.1154 -0.1225
(0.0007) (0.3283) (0.8550)
Hausman Test d results:
N*R2 Statistics 1.0857 1.9985 3.7950 *
(0.2974) (0.1575) (0.0514)
2001 2002 2003
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Table 4 
Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Board Independence 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 1% level (two-tail d), respectively. 
 
 
Dependent Variable
2SLSa N2SLSb 2SLSa 2SLSa N2SLSb 2SLSa 2SLSa N2SLSb 2SLSa
Voluntary Voluntary Fraction Voluntary Voluntary Fraction Voluntary Voluntary Fraction
Intercept -0.1620 -3.1412 -0.0037 -0.0843 -2.7098 0.3792 0.2958 -0.8252 0.3782
(0.0906) (<0.0001) (0.8692) (0.4653) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0953) (<0.0001)
Predicted Value of
|Discretionary Accruals| 1.2817 ** 6.1922** 0.2227 * 0.4581 2.3795 -0.0489 -0.5028 -3.1164 -0.0100
(0.0174) (0.0173) (0.0791) (0.6297) (0.6145) (0.7466) (0.1772) (0.1780) (0.8505)
Number of Directors 0.0366*** 0.1790*** 0.0047 ** 0.0337 *** 0.1597 *** -0.0137 *** -0.0025 -0.0140 -0.0054 ***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0139) (<0.0001) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.7602) (0.7654) (<0.0001)
Foreign Investors 0.7441*** 3.3594*** 0.1556 *** 0.3322 ** 1.5172 * 0.0325 -0.0021 -0.0005 0.0230
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0472) (0.0526) (0.2219) (0.9888) (0.9995) (0.2878)
N 517 517 517 571 571 571 575 575 575
Adjusted R2 6.21% 3.04% 3.04% 15.06% -0.15% 3.09%
First stage results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 16.87% 16.87% 3.05% 3.05% 3.83% 3.83%
F value at 1st stage 5.99 *** 5.99 *** 1.85 ** 1.85 ** 2.09 *** 2.09 ***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0032) (0.0032)
Simultaneity Testc results:
Residuals -1.198 ** -0.1692 -0.7642 0.0145 0.4918 0.0119
(0.0450) (0.2286) (0.4360) (0.9259) (0.2026) (0.8283)
Hausman Testd results:
N*R2 Statistics 23.6269 24.0922 12.6762 14.9031 17.1925 27.14 *
(0.1676) (0.1520) (0.8104) (0.6686) (0.5099) (0.0764)
Board Independence
2001 2002 2003
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Table 4 (Continued) 
 
a2SLS regression: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6| * ( ) * * * * *% * ( )| it it it it it it ititDA IND m Leverage SalesGrowth Age Boardsize Foreign Industry qb b b b b b b ft= + + + + + + + +
·
0 1 2 3*| | * *%( ) tit it it it iDA Boardsize ForeignIND m s s s s y= + + + +  
bN2SLS regression: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6| * * * * * *% * ( )| it it it it it it ititDA Voluntary Leverage SalesGrowth Age Boardsize Foreign Industry qb b b b b b b ft= + + + + + + + +  
Logistic 2nd stage: ·0 1 2 3*| | * *% tit it it it iDA Boardsize ForeignVoluntary s s s s y= + + + +  
cSimultaneity test: 
· µ0 1 2 3 4*| | * *% *( ) it it it it itDA Boardsize Foreign zIND m s s s s s f= + + + + +  
dHausman test: 
µ 0 1 2 3 4 5* *% * * *it it it it it itit Boardsize Foreign Leverage SalesGrowth Agey q q q q q q x= + + + + + +  
 
Variable definitions: 
IND(m), m=1,2. IND(1) =Voluntary and IND(2) = Fraction. Industry (q), q=1,…,16 and t is a vector of coefficients. 
Industry is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of one for each 2-digit industry classification. Fraction is calculated as number of 
independent directors/number of directors for firm i in year t. 
All other variables are defined as in Table 2.
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Table 5 
Test of Board Independence’s Effects on the Relationship between Accruals Change and 
Cash Flows Change 
 
Panel A: Voluntary as a proxy for board independence 
 
Panel B: Fraction as a proxy for board independence 
 
 
2001 2002 2003
Dependent Variable
Intercept -0.0321 -0.0106 0.0060
(<0.0001) (0.0069) (0.1860)
-0.8373 *** -0.7856 *** -0.7813 ***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
0.6504 *** 0.0784 -0.0609
(<0.0001) (0.1695) (0.3600)
0.0022 -0.0443 *** -0.0928 ***
(0.7173) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
-0.3927 *** -0.0980 0.0061
(<0.0001) (0.3381) (0.9667)
-0.2362 ** -0.0868
(0.0481) (0.5023)
N 887 1019 1074
Adjusted R2 37.71% 56.00% 45.75%
CashflowsD
( * )Cashflows VoluntaryD
( * )Cashflows LeverageD
( * )tCashflows RightsD
1( * )tCashflows Rights+D
AccrualsD AccrualsD AccrualsD
2001 2002 2003
Dependent Variable
Intercept -0.0321 -0.0123 0.0089
(<0.0001) (0.0040) (0.0623)
-0.7020 *** -0.7868 *** -0.5933 ***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
2.1791 *** 0.1993 -0.6443 *
(<0.0001) (0.3703) (0.0887)
0.0001 -0.0462 *** -0.0921 ***
(0.9926) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
-0.4802 *** -0.0954 -0.0151
(<0.0001) (0.3524) (0.9178)
-0.3247 *** -0.07445
(0.0086) (0.5689)
N 887 1019 1074
Adjusted R2 33.19% 55.95% 45.85%
CashflowsD
( * )Cashflows LeverageD
( * )tCashflows RightsD
1( * )tCashflows Rights+D
( * )Cashflows FractionD
AccrualsD AccrualsD AccrualsD
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Table 5 (Continued) 
 
 *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 1% level (two-tail d), respectively. 
0 1 2
3 4
* * ( * ( ))
* ( * ) *( * )
it it it it
it it it it it
Accruals Cashflows Cashflows IND m
Cashflows Leverage Cashflows Rights
g g g
g g u
D = + D + D
+ D + +
 
itAccrualsD  is defined TAit - TAit-1 / Assetsit for firm i in year t and itCashflowsD is defined as 
OCFit - OCFit-1 / Assetsit in firm i in year t. All other variables are defined as in Table 2 and Table 
4. 
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Table 6 
Univariate Tests of Earnings Management to Meet Regulatory Thresholds 
 
Panel A: Managing ROE using non-operating income to meet the rights issuance (6%) threshold 
EM  intervals +/-1%: ROE before non- perating income (ROEbefore)  is between 5%-6  and ROE after non-operating income (ROEafter)  is between 
6%-7%. +/-2%: ROEbefore is between 4%-6  and ROEafter is between 6%-8 . ROEbefore is between 3%-6  and ROEafter is between 6%-9 . # of firms 
represents the number of firms in the voluntary (non-voluntary) category falling into each of the EM intervals. 
 
 
# of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms# of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms
EM/Voluntary 0/70 0% 2/70 2.86% 2/70 2.86% Voluntary, EM 7/322 2.17% 8/322 2.48% 9/322 2.80%
EM/Nonvoluntary 31/918 3.38% 45/918 4.90% 50/918 5.45% Nonvoluntary, EM18/821 2.19% 31/821 3.78% 37/821 4.51%
Chi-square test Chi-square test
(p-value) 0.1182 0.4385 0.3497 (p-value) 0.9846 0.2793 0.1853
Fisher' s Exact test Fisher' s Exact test 
(p-value) 0.1606 0.7678 0.5752 (p-value) 1.0000 0.3653 0.2411
2002
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
2000
+/-3%+/-1% +/-2%
# of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms# of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms
EM/Voluntary 4/324 1.23% 10/314 3.09% 15/324 4.63% Voluntary, EM 5/283 1.77% 10/283 3.53% 13/283 4.59%
EM/Nonvoluntary 22/757 2.87% 38/767 4.95% 50/767 6.52% Nonvoluntary, EM17.888 1.91% 31/888 3.49% 37/888 4.17%
Chi-square test Chi-square test
(p-value) 0.1060 0.1692 0.2284 (p-value) 0.8734 0.9729 0.7570
Fisher' s Exact test Fisher' s Exact test 
(p-value) 0.1295 0.1976 0.2639 (p-value) 1.0000 1.0000 0.7373
2001
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
2003
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
# of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms# of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms
EM/Voluntary 4/394 1.02% 12/394 3.05% 17/394 4.31% EM/Voluntary 3/605 0.50% 18/605 2.98% 22/605 3.64%
EM/Nonvoluntary53/1685 3.15% 83/1685 4.93% 100/16855.93% EM/Nonvoluntary21/1709 1.23% 62/1709 3.63% 74/1709 4.33%
Chi-square test Chi-square test
(p-value) 0.0197** 0.1076 0.2091 (p-value) 0.1262 0.4502 0.4622
Fisher' s Exact test Fisher' s Exact test 
(p-value) 0.0160** 0.1391 0.2267 (p-value) 0.1621 0.5182 0.5531
2002 and 2003 combined
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
2000 and 2001 combined
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
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Table 6 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Managing ROE using non-operating income to meet the rights issuance (6%) threshold or to avoid losses 
 *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level (two-tail d), respectively. 
EM  intervals +/-1%: ROE before non- perating income (ROEbefore) is between 5%-6  (or –1%-0%) and ROE after non-operating income (ROEafter) is 
between 6%-7% (or 0%-1%). +/-2%: ROEbefore is between 4%-6% (or –2%-0%)  and ROEafter is between 6%-8% (or 0%-2%). ROEbefore is between 3%-
6% % (or –3%-0%)  and ROEafter is between 6%-9% (or 0%-3%). # of firms represents the number of firms in the voluntary (nonvoluntary) category 
falling into each of the EM intervals.  
 
# of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms
EM/Voluntary 0/70 0% 3/70 4.29% 3/70 4.29% EM/Voluntary 9/322 2.80% 11/322 3.42% 13/322 4.04%
EM/Nonvoluntary 37/918 4.03% 58/918 6.32% 70/918 7.63% EM/Nonvoluntary 25/821 3.05% 46/821 5.60% 62/821 7.55%
Chi square test Chi square test
(p-value) 0.0869 * 0.4959 0.3032 (p-value) 0.8229 0.1266 0.0309 **
Fisher' s Exact test Fisher' s Exact test 
(p-value) 0.1035 0.7948 0.4738 (p-value) 1.000    0.1339 0.0332 **
2002
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
2000
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
# of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms
EM/Voluntary 7/394 1.78% 17/394 4.31% 25/394 6.35% EM/Voluntary 17/605 2.81% 28/605 4.63% 36/605 5.95%
EM/Nonvoluntary72/1685 4.27% 120/16857.12% 148/16858.78% EM/Nonvoluntary53/1709 3.10% 104/17096.09% 140/17098.19%
Chi square test Chi square test
(p-value) 0.0196** 0.0432** 0.1147 (p-value) 0.7192 0.1841 0.0739 *
Fisher' s Exact test Fisher' s Exact test 
(p-value) 0.0185** 0.0425** 0.1285 (p-value) 0.7836 0.2206 0.0749 *
2002 and 2003 combined
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
2000 and 2001 combined
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
# of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms # of firms% of firms
EM/Voluntary 7/324 2.16% 14/324 4.32% 22/324 6.79% EM/Voluntary 8/283 2.83% 17/283 6.01% 23/283 8.13%
EM/Nonvoluntary 35/767 4.56% 62/767 8.08% 78/767 10.17% EM/Nonvoluntary 28/888 3.15% 58/888 6.53% 78/888 8.78%
Chi square test Chi square test
(p-value) 0.0595 * 0.0257** 0.0771 * (p-value) 0.7818 0.7537 0.7319
Fisher' s Exact test Fisher' s Exact test 
(p-value) 0.0601 * 0.0267** 0.0851 * (p-value) 1.000 0.8892 0.8084
2003
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
2001
+/-1% +/-2% +/-3%
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Table 7 
Regression Analysis on Earnings Management to Meet the Rights Issuance Threshold 
Using Voluntary as a Proxy for Board Independence 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable ( EM3)  interval ROE +/-1% of the rights issuance threshold 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 5%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-7%, otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.8315 -4.0848 0.0067 -3.5465 -1.9305 0.0516 -3.7621 -3.2852 0.02756 -3.7027 -2.5662 0.0424
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.6629) (<0.0001) (0.0161) (0.0005) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0921) (<0.0001) (0.6787) (0.7191)
Voluntary -12.5423 3.4936 0.0738 -0.9058 -7.1563 ** -0.1195 ** 0.0389 -1.6850 -0.0328 0.0135 -4.6811 -0.0887
(0.9718) (0.5213) (0.6658) (0.1020) (0.0207) (0.0165) (0.9322) (0.5499) (0.5603) (0.9792) (0.8563) (0.8567)
Leverage -0.9661 -1.1395 0.0000 -0.4611 -0.4062 -0.0006 -0.3469 -0.3472 -0.0004 -0.2567 -0.251 -0.0011
(0.1173) (0.1034) (0.9234) (0.2840) (0.3510) (0.7891) (0.3479) (0.3463) (0.6255) (0.4178) (0.4299) (0.5996)
Rightst 1.8147 *** 1.9106 *** 0.0754 *** 1.1946 *** 1.7256 *** 0.0489 *** 0.5321 0.6722 0.0191 -12.2065 -12.1588 -0.0197
(<0.0001) (0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0048) (0.0005) (0.0002) (0.3482) (0.2768) (0.2180) (0.9701) (0.9702) (0.2192)
Rightst+1 0.3293 -0.2947 -0.0047 -11.6400 -11.4048 -0.014 1.6618 ** 1.5986 ** 0.0729 ***
(0.6766) (0.7847) (0.8148) (0.9757) (0.9760) (0.5429) (0.0103) (0.0144) (0.0056)
N 904 744 744 1081 1074 1074 1107 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 3.14% 1.22% 0.88% -0.80%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.57% 4.16% 3.02% -0.31%
F value at 1st stage 3.37 *** 10.31 *** 7.83 *** 0.12
(0.0051) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9743)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals (0.1096) 0.01067 ** 0.03452 0.0885
(0.5257) (0.0358) (0.5463) (0.8572)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.9672 0.4296 0.6582 0.1138
(0.3254) (0.5122) (0.4172) (0.7359)
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable – EM3 interval ROE +/-2% of the rights issuance threshold 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 4%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-8%, otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.5287 -3.4785 0.0295 -2.8584 -1.9520 0.0729 -2.9916 -2.5344 0.0487 3.3192 -1.7840 0.0892
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1187) (<0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0175) (<0.0001) (0.6923) (0.5754)
Voluntary -0.4506 -0.7150 -0.0440 -0.5142 -3.9260 ** -0.1365 ** -0.4211 -2.0173 -0.0625 0.0929 -6.2650 -0.2217
(0.5455) (0.8803) (0.8347) (0.1621) (0.0478) (0.0414) (0.2996) (0.3734) (0.3752) (0.8036) (0.7393) (0.7387)
Leverage -0.1977 -0.1307 -0.0001 -0.6727 * -0.6415 * -0.0020 -0.5552 * -0.5600 * -0.0009 -0.0015 0.0066 0.0002
(0.5149) (0.6524) (0.8355) (0.0564) (0.0711) (0.4924) (0.0942) (0.0919) (0.4559) (0.9848) (0.9377) (0.9329)
Rightst 1.5796 *** 1.6231 *** 0.0968 *** 1.0118 *** 1.2995 *** 0.0686 *** 0.4594 0.5829 0.0275 -1.1358 -1.0725 -0.0220
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0021) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.3219) (0.2444) (0.1562) (0.2657) (0.3010) (0.3103)
Rightst+1 -0.4054 -1.0232 -0.0182 0.3525 0.4767 0.0155 1.1295 * 1.0777 * 0.0587 *
(0.5911) (0.3271) (0.4641) (0.6389) (0.5280) (0.6161) (0.0750) (0.0909) (0.0745)
N 904 744 744 1081 1074 1074 1107 1097 1097 1151 1138
Adjusted R2 3.78% 1.22% 0.19% -0.13%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.57% 4.16% 3.02% -0.31%
F value at 1st stage 3.37 *** 10.31 *** 7.83 *** 0.12
(0.0051) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9743)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals 0.0321 0.12256 * 0.051 0.2246
(0.8802) (0.0727) (0.4760) (0.7355)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.372 0.0134 0.1097 1.5932
(0.5419) (0.9078) (0.7405) (0.2069)
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable – EM3 interval ROE +/-3% of the rights issuance threshold 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 1% level (two-tail d), respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 3%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-9%, otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.3321 -3.177 0.0391 -2.7717 -2.1993 0.0853 -2.8583 -2.0511 0.0708 -3.1373 -1.8017 0.0983
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0483) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0014) (<0.0001) (0.6621) (0.5763)
Voluntary -0.5806 -2.0635 -0.1100 -0.3691 -2.4843 -0.1236 -0.4787 -3.395 -0.1189 0.1722 -5.3429 -0.2278
(0.4347) (0.6602) (0.6180) (0.2275) (0.1176) (0.1123) (0.2087) (0.1173) (0.1195) (0.6048) (0.7562) (0.7562)
Leverage -0.2750 -0.1852 -0.0001 -0.1371 -0.1167 -0.0015 -0.4288 -0.4367 -0.0011 0.0167 0.0233 0.0012
(0.3831) (0.5519) (0.7960) (0.4379) (0.5029) (0.6588) (0.1264) (0.1193) (0.3750) (0.7673) (0.7013) (0.7042)
Rights 1.5355 *** 1.5090 *** 0.1107 *** 0.7858 *** 0.9624 *** 0.0627 *** 0.2840 0.5276 0.0250 -1.3482 -1.2926 -0.0300
(<0..0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0086) (0.0033) (0.0024) (0.5346) (0.2871) (0.2328) (0.1852) (0.2102) (0.2110)
Rightst+1 -0.5421 -1.1592 -0.0223 0.3170 0.4007 0.0210 1.2729 ** 1.1774 ** 0.0824 **
(0.4699) (0.2647) (0.3915) (0.6083) (0.5192) (0.5594) (0.0232) (0.0371) (0.0209)
N 904 744 744 1081 1074 1074 1107 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 3.89% 0.60% 0.49% -0.70%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.57% 4.16% 3.02% -0.31%
F value at 1st stage 3.37 *** 10.31 *** 7.83 *** 0.12
(0.0051) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9743)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals 0.0939 0.1093 0.1051 0.2347
(0.6737) (0.1691) (0.1756) (0.7492)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.2976 0.2148 0.1097 0.4552
(0.5854) (0.6430) (0.7405) (0.4999)
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Table 7 (Continued) 
 
aLogistic regression: 0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Voluntary Leverage Rights Rightsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
bNonlinear two stage least squares (N2SLS): 
OLS 1st stage: 0 1 2 3 4 5 1* 3 * *% * *it it it it it it itVoluntary EM Boardsize Foreign Rights Rightsp p p p p p w+= + + + + + +  
Logistic 2nd stage: ·0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Voluntary Leverage Rights Rightsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
cTwo stage least squares (2SLS): 
OLS 1st stage: 0 1 2 3 4 5 1* 3 * *% * *it it it it it it itVoluntary EM Boardsize Foreign Rights Rightsp p p p p p w+= + + + + + +  
OLS 2nd stage: ·0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Voluntary Leverage Rights Rightsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
cSimultaneity test: 
· µ0 1 2 3 4 1 5* * * * *3it it it it it it ita a Voluntary a Leverage a R ghts a Rights a eEM w+= + + + + + +  
dHausman test: 
µ 0 1 2 3 4 5 1* *% * * *it it it it it it itb b Boardsize b Foreign b Leverage b Rights b Rights uw += + + + + + +  
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Table 8 
Regression Analysis on Earnings Management to Meet the Rights Issuance Threshold 
Using Fraction as a Proxy for Board Independence 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable ( EM3)  interval ROE +/-1% of the rights issuance threshold 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 4%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-8%, otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.8315 -3.9827 0.0122 -3.5721 -1.6201 0.0481 -4.2346 -3.8698 0.0163 -4.7013 -5.1959 -0.0055
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.4287) (<0.0001) (0.1454) (0.0020) (<0.0001) (0.0133) (0.6194) (0.0006) (0.3785) (0.9574)
Fraction -103.3000 4.4548 -0.0019 -3.9372 -41.3391* -0.5319 ** 1.9731 0.5372 0.0090 3.0442 4.6405 0.0821
(0.9415) (0.8892) (0.9983) (0.1261) (0.0579) (0.0440) (0.4539) (0.9331) (0.9471) (0.4440) (0.7977) (0.7977)
Leverage -0.9661 -1.1143 0.0000 -0.4592 -0.4015 -0.0006 -0.3462 -0.3465 -0.0003 -0.2584 -0.2583 -0.0012
(0.1173) (0.1109) (0.8956) (0.2858) (0.3568) (0.7722) (0.3491) (0.3495) (0.6970) (0.4144) (0.4125) (0.5268)
Rights 1.8147 *** 1.8899 *** 0.0746 *** 1.2053 *** 2.2749 *** 0.0536 *** 0.5181 0.5220 0.0163 -12.2037 -12.2188 -0.0209
(<0.0001) (0.0003) (<0.0001) (0.0044) (0.0020) (0.0002) (0.3605) (0.3582) (0.2702) (0.9699) (0.9700) (0.1742)
Rightst+1 0.3293 -0.2424 -0.0039 -11.6069 -10.7503 -0.0065 1.656 ** 1.648 ** 0.0740 ***
(0.6766) (0.8219) (0.8453) (0.9756) (0.9778) (0.7834) (0.0106) (0.0110) (0.0049)
N 904 744 744 1080 1074 1074 1106 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 3.12% 1.06% 0.49% -0.07%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.46% 3.27% 17.22% 4.02%
F value at 1st stage 3.2 *** 8.25 *** 46.6 *** 12.92
(0.0073) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals -0.137 0.4733 * 0.0399 -0.0350
(0.8780) (0.0769) (0.7892) (0.9151)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 1.116 2.148 1.097 0.1138
(0.2908) (0.1428) (0.2949) (0.7359)
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable ( EM3)  interval ROE +/-2% of the rights issuance threshold 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 4%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-8%, otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.5739 -3.3644 0.0334 -2.8799 -1.7219 0.0735 -2.7290 -3.8877 0.0068 -4.6759 1.8117 0.2184
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0800) (<0.0001) (0.0130) (0.0004) (<0.0001) (0.0030) (0.8868) (<0.0001) (0.6439) (0.1208)
Fraction 0.7462 -12.0110 -0.4871 -2.1153 -23.9732* -0.6910 * -1.5359 3.3593 0.1024 4.1692 -15.7754 -0.5616
(0.8068) (0.6717) (0.6546) (0.1902) (0.0604) (0.0512) (0.4692) (0.5260) (0.5466) (0.1637) (0.1948) (0.1949)
Leverage -0.1902 -0.1262 -0.0001 -0.6709 -0.6363 * -0.0019 -0.5576 * -0.5612 * -0.0007 -0.0025 0.0044 0.0002
(0.5294) (0.6626) (0.8202) (0.0571) (0.0734) (0.5043) (0.0941) (0.0921) (0.5472) (0.9758) (0.9563) (0.9538)
Rights 1.5892 *** 1.5809 *** 0.0952 *** 1.0201 *** 1.6389 *** 0.0763 *** 0.4330 0.3901 0.0217 -1.1524 -1.0824 -0.0223
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0007) (<0.0001) (0.3492) (0.4004) (0.2412) (0.2589) (0.2893) (0.2822)
Rightst+1 -0.4063 -1.0183 -0.0185 0.3692 -0.8774 0.0258 1.1549 * 1.1266 * 0.0602 *
(0.5903) (0.3286) (0.4548) (0.6233) (0.2768) (0.4156) (0.0684) (0.0756) (0.0667)
N 904 744 744 1080 1074 1074 1106 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 3.80% 1.19% 0.15% 0.00%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.46% 3.27% 17.22% 4.02%
F value at 1st stage 3.2 *** 8.25 *** 46.6 *** 12.92
(0.0073) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals 0.5628 0.6292 * -0.1868 0.7135
(0.6090) (0.0798) (0.3178) (0.1070)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.2232 0.3222 0.5485 0.0002
(0.6366) (0.5703) (0.4589) (0.9887)
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Table 8 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable ( EM3)  interval ROE +/-3% of the rights is uance threshold 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 1% level (two-tail d), respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 3%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-9%, otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.3725 -3.0608 0.0423 -2.7874 -2.0487 0.0883 -2.7515 -4.3921 -0.0129 -4.6836 -0.5164 0.1512
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0338) (<0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (<0.0001) (0.0004) (0.7728) (<0.0001) (0.8890) (0.3309)
Fraction 0.1063 -19.2008 -0.7819 -1.5300 -15.2546 -0.6717 -0.9202 5.9368 0.2114 4.7932 * -7.9138 -0.3312
(0.9724) (0.5036) (0.4926) (0.2526) (0.1098) (0.1033) (0.6398) (0.2367) (0.2505) (0.0800) (0.4887) (0.4890)
Leverage -0.2691 -0.1823 -0.0001 -0.1356 -0.1114 -0.0014 -0.4300 -0.4378 -0.0008 0.0158 0.0189 0.0010
(0.3935) (0.5592) (0.7840) (0.4413) (0.5224) (0.6817) (0.1270) (0.1200) (0.5295) (0.7790) (0.7347) (0.7348)
Rights 1.5419 *** 1.4512 *** 0.0984 *** 0.7928 *** 1.1787 *** 0.0709 *** 0.2507 0.1940 -0.0139 -1.3676 -1.3188 -0.0311
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0081) (0.0033) (0.0018) (0.5825) (0.6716) (0.4871) (0.1792) (0.1953) (0.1749)
Rightst+1 -0.5429 -1.1660 -0.0232 0.3307 0.6520 0.0313 1.2956 ** 1.2566 ** 0.0852 **
(0.4693) (0.2609) (0.3704) (0.5930) (0.3198) (0.3962) (0.0206) (0.0251) (0.0167)
N 904 744 744 1080 1074 1074 1106 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 3.92% 0.61% 0.39% 0.00%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.46% 3.27% 17.22% 4.02%
F value at 1st stage 3.2 *** 8.25 *** 46.6 *** 12.92
(0.0073) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals 0.839 0.6094 -0.301 0.5215
(0.4662) (0.1449) (0.1375) (0.2861)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.0744 0.0000 1.2067 0.0000
(0.7850) (0.9956) (0.2720) (0.9966)
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Table 8 (Continued) 
aLogistic regression: 
0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Fraction Leverage Rights R ghtsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
bNonlinear two stage least squares (N2SLS): 
OLS 1st stage: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 1* 3 * *% * *it it it it it it itFraction EM Boards ze Foreign Rights Rightsp p p p p p w+= + + + + + +  
Logistic 2nd stage:  
·
0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Fraction Leverage Rights R ghtsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
cTwo stage least squares (2SLS): 
OLS 1st stage:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 1* 3 * *% * *it it it it it it itFraction EM Boards ze Foreign Rights Rightsp p p p p p w+= + + + + + +  
OLS 2nd stage:  
·
0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Fraction Leverage Rights R ghtsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
cSimultaneity test: 
· µ0 1 2 3 4 1 5* * * * *3it it it it it it ita a Fraction a Leverage a Rights a Rights a eEM w+= + + + + + +  
dHausman test: 
µ 0 1 2 3 4 5 1* *% * * *it it it it it it itb b Boardsize b Foreign b Leverage b Rights b Rights uw += + + + + + +  
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Table 9 
Regression Analysis on Earnings Management to Meet Regulatory Thresholds 
Using Voluntary as a Proxy for Board Independence 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable (EM3) interval ROE +/-1% of the rights issuance threshold or the loss threshold 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 5%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-7%, or ROEbefore is between -1%-0% and ROEafter is between 0%-1%, 
otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.4768 -3.4149 0.0211 -2.7928 -2.1978 0.0634 -3.3647 -3.1036 0.0350 -3.0446 -0.1925 0.1299
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.2098) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0008) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0638) (<0.0001) (0.9661) (0.3898)
Voluntary -12.7203 0.9249 0.0046 -0.7765 * -2.8683 -0.0938 -0.1714 -1.0787 -0.0289 -0.0309 -11.8947 -0.3930
(0.7909) (0.8590) (0.9803) (0.0664) (0.1492) (0.1400) (0.6801) (0.6507) (0.6558) (0.9399) (0.5303) (0.5327)
Leverage -0.6783 -0.8862 0.0000 -0.5706 * -0.5482 -0.0021 -0.2824 -0.2847 -0.0006 -0.4355 -0.4217 -0.0020
(0.1625) (0.1214) (0.8453) (0.0968) (0.1139) (0.4447) (0.3403) (0.3370) (0.5920) (0.1247) (0.1379) (0.4502)
Rights 1.4778 *** 1.3867 *** 0.0701 *** 0.5607 0.7402 * 0.0342 ** 0.211 0.2785 0.0105 -13.2773 -13.1538 -0.0308
(0.0001) (0.0008) (<0.0001) (0.1269) (0.0656) (0.0420) (0.7020) (0.6353) (0.5544) (0.9746) (0.9748) (0.1348)
Rightst+1 -0.1124 -0.773 -0.0131 -12.8738 -12.832 -0.0327 1.3084 ** 1.2714 ** 0.0654 **
(0.8834) (0.4632) (0.5546) (0.9793) (0.9797) (0.2661) (0.0397) (0.0471) (0.0308)
N 904 744 744 1081 1074 1074 1107 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 2.33% 0.37% 0.14% 0.11%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.57% 4.16% 3.02% -0.31%
F value at 1st stage 3.37 *** 10.31 *** 7.83 *** 0.12
(0.0051) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9743)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals -0.0462 0.0728 0.0249 0.3911
(0.8070) (0.2614) (0.7055) (0.5349)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.9672 2.0406 0.0006 1.1380
(0.3254) (0.1531) (0.9799) (0.2861)
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Table 9 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable (EM3) interval ROE +/-2% of the rights issuance threshold or the loss threshold 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 4%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-8%, or ROEbefore is between -2%-0% and ROEafter is between 0%-2%, 
otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.0389 -3.3349 0.0288 -2.3303 -1.9141 0.1002 -2.6403 -2.1291 0.0764 -2.5751 -0.5944 0.2806
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1649) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0017) (<0.0001) (0.8526) (0.1848)
Voluntary -0.3262 2.3852 0.122 -0.6684 ** -2.1145 -0.1263 -0.5795 -2.3344 -0.1013 -0.0362 -13.3762 -0.8871
(0.5951) (0.5456) (0.5975) (0.0293) (0.1429) (0.1358) (0.1054) (0.2225) (0.2252) (0.8996) (0.3177) (0.3145)
Leverage -0.0736 -0.1154 -0.0001 -0.3522 -0.3313 -0.0032 (0.3349) -0.3406 -0.0012 -0.0447 -0.0222 -0.0004
(0.6521) (0.6149) (0.8371) (0.1101) (0.1337) (0.3796) (0.1540) (0.1475) (0.3818) (0.6386) (0.8145) (0.9214)
Rights 1.1521 *** 1.3545 *** 0.0961 *** 0.5831 ** 0.7054 ** 0.0548 ** 0.0870 0.2281 0.0143 -1.8266 * -1.6642 -0.0467
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0412) (0.0227) (0.0137) (0.8468) (0.6339) (0.5332) (0.0716) (0.1037) (0.1050)
Rights2 -0.5098 -0.7145 -0.0209 -0.3378 -0.2796 -0.0144 0.7064 0.6433 0.0422
(0.4086) (0.3430) (0.4424) (0.6475) (0.7055) (0.7106) (0.2586) (0.3055) (0.2785)
N 904 744 744 1081 1074 1074 1107 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 2.97% 0.43% -0.05% 0.19%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.57% 4.16% 3.02% -0.31%
F value at 1st stage 3.37 *** 10.31 *** 7.83 *** 0.12
(0.0051) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9743)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals -0.129 0.0918 0.0798 0.8821
(0.5809) (0.2834) (0.3464) (0.3175)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.1488 0.9666 0.1097 0.1138
(0.6997) (0.3255) (0.7405) (0.7359)
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Table 9 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable (EM3) interval ROE +/-3% of the rights issuance threshold or the loss threshold 
 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 1% level (two-tail d), respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 3%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-9%, or ROEbefore is between -3%-0% and ROEafter is between 0%-3%, 
otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -2.7238 -3.0121 0.0388 -2.169 -1.9734 0.1132 -2.4145 -1.5498 0.1188 -2.309 0.0841 0.2939
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0826) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0016) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9766) (0.2288)
Voluntary -0.5200 2.8699 0.1739 -0.4320 * -1.0872 -0.0879 -0.6921 ** -3.6614 ** -0.1969 ** -0.0444 -10.92 -0.8582
(0.3941) (0.4259) (0.4850) (0.0879) (0.3629) (0.3579) (0.0330) (0.0368) (0.0367) (0.8587) (0.4006) (0.3993)
Leverage -0.1163 -0.1662 -0.0001 -0.1315 -0.1205 -0.0032 -0.1618 -0.2330 -0.0016 0.0174 0.0325 0.0031
(0.5122) (0.4809) (0.7929) (0.3297) (0.3639) (0.4408) (0.3352) (0.2064) (0.2822) (0.6686) (0.4575) (0.4680)
Rights 0.9721 *** 1.0995 *** 0.0921 *** 0.4262 0.4787 *** 0.0453 * -0.1843 0.0662 0.0059 -1.4130 * -1.292 * -0.0569
(0.0003) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (0.1037) (0.0878) (0.0735) (0.6778) (0.8878) (0.8198) (0.0510) (0.0782) (0.0873)
Rights2 -0.7693 -1.0231 -0.0352 -0.2737 -0.24 -0.0168 0.7343 0.6419 0.0561
(0.2078) (0.1694) (0.2307) (0.6538) (0.6948) (0.7043) (0.1832) (0.2474) (0.2022)
N 904 744 744 1081 1074 1074 1107 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 2.51% 0.07% 0.28% 0.20%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.57% 4.16% 3.02% -0.31%
F value at 1st stage 3.37 *** 10.31 *** 7.83 *** 0.1200
(0.0051) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.9743)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals -0.1938 0.0575 0.1674 * 0.8518
(0.4416) (0.5555) (0.0800) (0.4031)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.0078 0.1074 0.0012 0.3414
(0.9298) (0.7431) (0.9726) (0.5590)
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Table 9 (Continued) 
 
aLogistic regression: 
0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Voluntary Leverage Rights Rightsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
bNonlinear two stage least squares (N2SLS): 
OLS 1st stage: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 1* 3 * *% * *it it it it it it itVoluntary EM Boardsize Foreign Rights Rightsp p p p p p w+= + + + + + +  
Logistic 2nd stage:  
·
0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Voluntary Leverage Rights Rightsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
cTwo stage least squares (2SLS): 
OLS 1st stage:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 1* 3 * *% * *it it it it it it itVoluntary EM Boardsize Foreign Rights Rightsp p p p p p w+= + + + + + +  
OLS 2nd stage:  
·
0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Voluntary Leverage Rights Rightsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
cSimultaneity test: 
· µ0 1 2 3 4 1 5* * * * *3it it it it it it ita a Voluntary a Leverage a R ghts a Rights a eEM w+= + + + + + +  
dHausman test: 
µ 0 1 2 3 4 5 1* *% * * *it it it it it it itb b Boardsize b Foreign b Leverage b Rights b Rights uw += + + + + + +  
  
 
 
7
9 
Table 10 
Regression Analysis on Earnings Management to Meet Regulatory Thresholds 
Using Fraction as a Proxy for Board Independence 
 
Panel A: Dependent variable (EM3) interval ROE +/-1% of the rights issuance threshold or the l ss threshold 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 5%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-7%, or ROEbefore is between -1%-0% and ROEafter is between 0%-1%, 
otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.4768 *** -3.2126 *** 0.0269 -2.8582 *** -2.4749 *** 0.0539 *** -3.7228 *** -3.9316 *** 0.0131 -2.9925 *** -3.9118 0.009
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1123) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0066) (<0.0001) (0.0046) (0.7286) (0.0018) (0.3921) (0.9462)
Fraction -105.7 -9.7193 -0.374 -2.1604 -8.9474 -0.2952 1.2893 2.2243 0.0576 -0.1812 2.6853 0.0823
(0.9387) (0.7608) (0.6993) (0.2198) (0.3969) (0.3806) (0.5756) (0.6937) (0.7120) (0.9494) (0.8483) (0.8413)
Leverage -0.6783 -0.8757 -0.0001 -0.5694 * -0.5538 -0.0023 -0.2813 -0.2856 -0.0005 -0.4363 -0.4369 -0.0026
(0.1625) (0.1262) (0.8192) (0.0981) (0.1094) (0.4052) (0.3428) (0.3366) (0.6402) (0.1238) (0.1224) (0.3056)
Rights 1.4778 *** 1.3347 *** 0.0684 *** 0.5517 0.7489 0.0344 * 0.1859 0.1704 0.0078 -13.278 -13.2847 -0.0349
(0.0001) (0.0020) (<0.0001) (0.1310) (0.1115) (0.0631) (0.7357) (0.7575) (0.6469) (0.9746) (0.9746) (0.0765)
Rightst+1 -0.1124 -0.7503 -0.0129 -12.8818 -12.7454 -0.0294 1.3120 ** 1.2957 ** 0.0661 **
(0.8834) (0.4757) (0.5587) (0.9794) (0.9800) (0.3304) (0.0391) (0.0418) (0.0289)
N 904 744 744 1080 1074 1074 1106 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 2.35% 0.24% 0.13% 0.08%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.46% 3.27% 17.22% 4.02%
F value at 1st stage 3.2 *** 8.25 *** 46.6 *** 12.92
(0.0073) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals 0.2087 0.2330 -0.0264 -0.0952
(0.8309) (0.4947) (0.8782) (0.8208)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.8184 3.4368 * 0.1097 0.4552
(0.3656) (0.0638) (0.7405) (0.4999)
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Dependent variable (EM3) interval ROE +/-2% of the rights issuance threshold or the loss threshold 
 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 4%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-8%, or ROEbefore is between -2%-0% and ROEafter is between 0%-2%, 
otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -3.0817 *** -3.2789 *** 0.0325 -2.3824 *** -2.0452 *** 0.0915 *** -2.4471 *** -4.161 *** -0.0111 -3.0114 *** -2.8886 0.0517
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.1195) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0005) (<0.0001) (0.0003) (0.8189) (<0.0001) (0.3687) (0.7823)
Fraction 1.142 8.3657 0.3706 -2.0844 -8.04 -0.4673 -1.3774 5.7954 0.248 1.3125 0.8724 0.0502
(0.6490) (0.6906) (0.7562) (0.1111) (0.3060) (0.2936) (0.4436) (0.2058) (0.2176) (0.5302) (0.9297) (0.9305)
Leverage -0.0695 -0.1125 -0.0001 -0.3498 -0.3339 -0.0034 -0.3345 -0.3401 -0.0009 -0.0457 -0.0407 -0.0016
(0.6565) (0.6199) (0.8236) (0.1128) (0.1309) (0.3566) (0.1565) (0.1486) (0.4957) (0.6330) (0.6601) (0.6484)
Rights 1.1619 *** 1.366 *** 0.0965 *** 0.5792 ** 0.7509 ** 0.0572 ** 0.0493 -0.0060 0.0044 -1.8329 * -1.7981 -0.0556
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0425) (0.0369) (0.0195) (0.9127) (0.9894) (0.8398) (0.0707) (0.0764) (0.0440)
Rightst+1 -0.5127 -0.6881 -0.0198 -0.3263 -0.1753 -0.0085 0.7345 0.6923 0.0443
(0.4060) (0.3599) (0.4670) (0.6585) (0.8170) (0.8320) (0.2394) (0.2681) (0.2550)
N 904 744 744 1080 1074 1074 1106 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 2.95% 0.33% -0.05% 0.10%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.46% 3.27% 17.22% 4.02%
F value at 1st stage 3.2 *** 8.25 *** 46.6 *** 12.92
(0.0073) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals -0.2305 0.3596 -0.3794 * 0.0169
(0.8484) (0.4249) (0.0867) (0.9771)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.372 2.148 0.1097 1.138
(0.5419) (0.1428) (0.7405) (0.2861)
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Table 10 (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Dependent variable (EM3) interval ROE +/-3% of the rights issuance threshold or the loss threshold 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 1 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Dependent variable: 
EM3 =1 if ROEbefore is between 3%-6% and ROEafter is between 6%-9%, or ROEbefore is between -3%-0% and ROEafter is between 0%-3%, 
otherwise EM3=0. All other variables are defined as in Table 6. 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003
Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc Logistica N2SLSb 2SLSc
Intercept -2.7618 *** -2.9924 *** 0.0406 * -2.193 *** -2.011 *** 0.1098 *** -2.3062 *** -4.3591 *** -0.0341 -2.339 *** -3.3974 0.007
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.0718) (<0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (0.5364) (<0.0001) (0.2280) (0.9740)
Fraction 0.1857 13.3183 0.7728 -1.6552 -4.7852 -0.3770 -0.9992 7.5487 * 0.4102 * 0.0602 3.2822 0.2501
(0.9413) (0.4697) (0.5482) (0.1370) (0.4641) (0.4567) (0.5313) (0.0671) (0.0708) (0.9726) (0.7047) (0.7066)
Leverage -0.1111 -0.1645 -0.0001 -0.1298 -0.1206 -0.0032 -0.2208 -0.2298 -0.0011 0.0174 0.0174 0.0018
(0.5240) (0.4822) (0.7872) (0.3331) (0.3634) (0.4341) (0.2330) (0.2146) (0.4652) (0.6689) (0.6687) (0.6516)
Rights -0.9779 *** 1.1282 *** 0.0937 *** -0.4312 * 0.5192 0.0483 * -0.2297 -0.2934 -0.0129 -1.4141 * 1.4016 -0.0661
(0.0002) (0.0003) (<0.0001) (0.1000) (0.1037) (0.0827) (0.6039) (0.5087) (0.6034) (0.0508) (0.0531) (0.0379)
Rightst+1 -0.7718 -0.9947 -0.0336 -0.2601 -0.1729 -0.0116 -0.7755 0.7257 0.0604
(0.2063) (0.1806) (0.2508) (0.6701) (0.7825) (0.7989) (0.1586) (0.1884) (0.1687)
N 904 744 744 1080 1074 1074 1106 1097 1097 1151 1138 1138
Adjusted R2 2.49% 0.04% 0.18% 0.15%
First Stage Results:
Adjusted R2 at 1st stage 1.46% 3.27% 17.22% 4.02%
F value at 1st stage 3.2 *** 8.25 *** 46.6 *** 12.92
(0.0073) (<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Simultaneity Testd results:
Residuals -0.6941 0.2601 -0.5709 ** -0.2694
(0.5935) (0.6123) (0.0224) (0.6917)
Hausman Testeresults:
N*R2 Statistics 0.0744 0.4296 1.097 0.0744
(0.7850) (0.5122) (0.2949) (0.7850)
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 Table 10 (Continued) 
aLogistic regression: 
0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Fraction Leverage Rights R ghtsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
bNonlinear two stage least squares (N2SLS): 
OLS 1st stage: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 1* 3 * *% * *it it it it it it itFraction EM Boards ze Foreign Rights Rightsp p p p p p w+= + + + + + +  
Logistic 2nd stage:  
·
0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Fraction Leverage Rights R ghtsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
cTwo stage least squares (2SLS): 
OLS 1st stage:  
0 1 2 3 4 5 1* 3 * *% * *it it it it it it itFraction EM Boards ze Foreign Rights Rightsp p p p p p w+= + + + + + +  
OLS 2nd stage:  
·
0 1 2 3 4 13 * * * *it it it it it itEM Fraction Leverage Rights R ghtsp p p p p w+= + + + + +  
cSimultaneity test: 
· µ0 1 2 3 4 1 5* * * * *3it it it it it it ita a Fraction a Leverage a Rights a Rights a eEM w+= + + + + + +  
dHausman test: 
µ 0 1 2 3 4 5 1* *% * * *it it it it it it itb b Boardsize b Foreign b Leverage b Rights b Rights uw += + + + + + +  
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Table 11 
Chow Tests on the Change in Discretionary Accruals from 2001 to 2002 
 
Panel A: Change in |DA| for all firms from 2001 to 2002 
 
OLS regression: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
| | * * 01 * * 01 * * 01
            * * 02 * * 02 * * 02
it it it it
it it it it
DA Leverage Y SalesGrowth Y Age Y
Leverage Y SalesGrowth Y Age Y
j j j j
j j j h
= + + +
+ + + +
  
Y01 equals 1 if year is 2001 and equals to 0 otherwise; Y02 equals 1 if year is 2002 and equals 0 
otherwise. All other variables are defined as in Table 2. 
2001 2002 Pooled 2001 and 2002
OLS OLS OLS
Dependent Variable|Discretionary Accruals| |Discretionary Accruals| |Discretionary Accruals|
Intercept 0.0480 *** 0.0603 *** 0.0539 ***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Leverage *Y01 0.0055 *** 0..0055 ***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Sales Growth *Y01 0.0192 *** 0.0190 ***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Age *Y01 0.0016 0.0010
(0.1158) (0.2249)
Leverage *Y02 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.6457) (0.6660)
Sales Growth *Y02 0.0106 * 0.0112 **
(0.0433) (0.0347)
Age *Y02 0.0009 0.0015 **
(0.3268) (0.0313)
N 519 576 1095
Adjusted R2 6.00% 0.39% 3.14%
ESS 3.5006 3.5828 7.0907
F statistics (Chow test)
1.1341
(0.2871)
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Table 11 (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Change in |DA| for Firms that begin to adopt independent directors in 2002 
 
 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 1% level (two-tail d), respectively. 
OLS regression: 
0 1 2 3
4 5 6
7 8
| | * * 01 * * 01 * * 01
            * * 01 * * 02 * * 02
            * * 02 * * 02
it pre it itit
it pre itit
it it it
DA Voluntary Y Leverage Y SalesGrowth Y
Age Y Voluntary Y Leverage Y
SalesGrowth Y Age Y
j j j j
j j j
j j h
= + + +
+ + +
+ + +
 
All variables are defined as in Table 2.
2001 2002 Pooled 2001 and 2002
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Dependent Variable|Discretionary Accruals| |Discretionary Accruals| |Discretionary Accruals|
Intercept 0.0781 *** 0.0800 *** 0.07884 ***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Voluntarypre *Y01 -0.1113 *** -0.1127 ***
(0.0007) (<0.0001)
Leverage *Y01 0.0059 *** 0.0059 ***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Sales Growth *Y01 0.024 *** 0.024 ***
(<0.0001) (<0.0001)
Age *Y01 0.0019 * 0.0018 *
(0.0650) (0.0507)
Voluntarypre * Y02 -0.0638 -0.06095 *
(0.1423) (0.0663)
Leverage *Y02 -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.6983) (0.7011)
Sales Growth *Y02 0.0099 * 0.0100 *
(0.0580) (0.0580)
Age *Y02 0.0010 0.0010
(0.2881) (0.2707)
N 517 571 1088
Adjusted R2 7.94% 0.53% 4.31%
ESS 3.4154 3.5452 6.9609
0.0562
(0.8127)
F statistics (Chow test)
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Figure 1 
Return on Equity Distribution from 2000 to 2003 
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